Reclaiming Space: The Legacy of Gezi and the Struggle for Post-Disaster Planning in Turkey

© 2013 by Yücel Tunca © 2013 by Yücel Tunca

Reclaiming Space: The Legacy of Gezi and the Struggle for Post-Disaster Planning in Turkey

By : Deren Ertas

[This article is part of the Roundtable Discussion: “Remembering Gezi—Beyond Nostalgia Ten Years On" produced by Jadaliyya’s Turkey Page Editors. Read the roundtable introduction by guest editors Birgan Gökmenoğlu and Derya Özkaya and see the other articles of this roundtable here.]

The devastating earthquakes of February 6, 2023, resulted in the total destruction of Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, and Adıyaman, along with numerous towns and villages reduced to rubble. Over 50,000 people perished, with scores more displaced. The timing of the calamity, just months before the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, turned the disaster into a political tool. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) promised speedy reconstruction; the opposing coalition led by the People’s Republican Party (CHP) criticized the government’s construction policies that allowed shoddy buildings to be erected in an earthquake-prone area and its mismanagement of the acute stages of the disaster. 

However, Turkey’s “earthquake election,” as one New Yorker article called it, did not end up toppling Erdogan. Many imagined that the provinces affected by the disaster would vote for the opposition, but they overwhelmingly did not. As a response, social media experienced an upsurge in hostile messages directed at the earthquake victims, implying that the overwhelming support and assistance received in the aftermath of the earthquake were contingent on them delivering electoral results for the opposition. But it doesn’t take a huge leap of imagination to understand their decision to vote for the ruling party. In a region that faced under-development and neglect until the 2000s, people do not expect the CHP and its conservative allies to deliver on their promises.

It was facile to imagine that people would change their political positions because of a disaster, especially when the opposition failed to deliver a compelling alternate vision for the future. Yes, many undecided voters cast their ballots for the AKP due to the opposing coalition’s decision to enter a strategic alliance with the Kurds, but post-Gezi politics shows that political allegiances—whether motivated by national, ethnic, religious, or other subjectivities—can be destabilized by participating in conjoined struggles. Meaningful political change requires grassroots organizing and the exploration of alternative political visions. Political struggles and contestations over how to organize urban and rural spaces can play a crucial role in this transformative process. 

Just as it had happened ten years ago during the Gezi Uprising, the question of how people organize their living spaces—whether cities, towns, or villages—is at the center of the political struggle for Turkey’s future today. And if it isn’t, it should be. Gezi reminded people that they should have a say over the spatial organization of their cities, that they need not submit to baneful mega-projects eating up green spaces and constricting life. Since then, many struggles have arisen across Turkey that carry on the protests’ ecological vision, intersectional solidarity, and non-hierarchical practices. In the earthquake zone, some organizations and collectives are thinking creatively with locals about what post-disaster architecture might look like. We can, and should, hold onto this vision of Gezi, especially right now when an area roughly the size of Portugal in southern and southeastern Turkey is being built anew.

Gezi reminded people that they should have a say over the spatial organization of their cities, that they need not submit to baneful mega-projects eating up green spaces and constricting life… We can, and should, hold onto this vision of Gezi, especially right now when an area roughly the size of Portugal in southern and southeastern Turkey is being built anew.

Beyond Electoral Politics


Both the Gezi Uprising and the Kahramanmaraş earthquake gave rise to imaginaries of political change, and both failed to produce such change within the temporal horizons of electoral cycles. It is, therefore, necessary to direct our attention to somewhere other than electoral politics, both in terms of how we understand the longer impact of Gezi and how we build political alliances in the current moment. The post-disaster organizing and community-building that oppositional organizations are undertaking in the earthquake zone inspire hope. They can give rise to new political horizons within and beyond the electoral moment. 

Until the election cycle of 2015, the agitation from below and the new political alignments they inspired allowed Gezi to remain a beacon of hope. In the June 7, 2015, elections, the AKP lost its majority in the parliament for the first time since coming to power in 2002. To achieve this, many, for the first time, voted for a party that aligned itself with the Kurdish cause, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). Not conceding defeat, Erdogan moved to delegitimize the election results and introduced roadblocks to coalition-building. That summer, the state renewed its war with the Kurds. While he used the Syrian Civil War and the YPG’s armament as an excuse, it was ultimately a punitive action for his electoral loss of the southeastern Kurdish-majority provinces. Instilling fears of Kurdish “terrorism” and the need for stability at a time of war of his construction, he won the November 1, 2015 elections, reinstating the AKP’s parliamentary majority.

Since then, politics and public life in Turkey have taken a nose-dive for the worse. With the attempted coup of July 15, 2016, Erdogan obliterated opposing factions within the military and the bureaucracy. It ushered in a new era of political repression, leaving little space for contentious politics. The sieges of Silvan and the Sur district of Diyarbakir announced a new era of state violence in Kurdistan that is ongoing. Attempts to combat gender-based violence hit a significant roadblock with Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in March 2021. With the conclusion of the Gezi trialsin June 2022, activists Mücella Yapıcı, Tayfun Kahraman, Can Atalay, Mine Özerden, Çiğdem Mater, Hakan Altınay, and Yiğit Emekçi were sentenced to 18 years in prison alongside philanthropist Osman Kavala, who is serving a life sentence. There is an ongoing lawsuit initiated in 2021 aimed at shutting down the HDP. Its co-chairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, have been in prison since 2016 and 2017, respectively. Its members—local politicians, candidates for parliament, and others—are either behind bars or face the threat of confinement daily. The number of journalists jailed in the country doubled in 2022. In the meantime, the ongoing economic and financial crisis has led to the erosion of the Turkish lira’s value and runaway inflation, creating a cost-of-living crisis, the burden of which falls on the country’s working classes and the poor. 

The earthquakes hit amid this economic crisis, which had already galvanized opposition to the AKP and Erdogan’s fiscal policies. The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) mismanaged search-and-rescue operations, and the state failed to quickly provide adequate aid to survivors. The preventable character of the deaths and destruction that ensued in the days after the earthquakes made the grievous outcome all the more enraging, a sense that gripped many in Turkey in the following weeks. Before the earthquake, experts had warned for years about the increasing tension along the South Anatolian fault line, highlighting the potential for a disastrous earthquake. These warnings went unheeded, and public institutions, like the Hatay Iskenderun State Hospital, which had previously failed earthquake resilience tests, were not rebuilt to meet the necessary standards. What made matters worse was that not only older buildings that had been built during the construction craze of the last century collapsed. Those built under new construction codes, put in place after the 1999 Gölcük earthquake that claimed 17,000 lives, also crumbled.

As the disaster occurred only a few months before the anticipated elections of 2023, it quickly became an object of electoral contention. Many in the opposition, bolstered by surveys, believed that the earthquake and the systemic violence it exposed would spell the end of days for Erdogan and the AKP in office. This optimism was short-lived when the AKP won the majority of seats in the parliament in the first round of the elections, and Erdogan won the presidency in the second round. The electoral failure of the opposition has generated considerable pessimism among citizens of Turkey, that are dissatisfied with the AKP and Erdogan’s 20-plus-year reign. While despair is an ever-present option, it remains important to attend to the less visible, yet perhaps more critical, transformations that are taking place in the post-disaster spaces of encounter. 

Emergent Structures


Gezi did not topple the regime, nor did the February 6 earthquakes. Nonetheless, it introduced a modest break in the political structures that had been dominant since the 1980 coup d’état. In the period following the military takeover, the brutal repression of the left in Turkey overwhelmingly disempowered civil society. This is not to say that political life in Turkey was dormant for three decades until Gezi erupted out of nowhere. In many ways, Gezi spoke to a protest tradition carried on despite the state repression of the 1980s by different organizations and collectives. However, it involved new political actors (it was a mass movement) and practices. 

The Gezi Uprising brought together large factions on the broader topography of the discontented in a dual criticism of neoliberalism and authoritarianism. Highly polarized and antagonistic publics arrived at the park with a shared purpose. These publics included Alevis and Sunnis, Kurds and Turks, the rich and the poor, and the violently marginalized LGBTQ community, among others. They aimed to preserve Gezi Park as a green space in a city increasingly congested by concrete. Ultimately, they also sought to end a regime that allowed little room for public discourse and debate on issues that profoundly impacted their daily existence. 

Gezi did not only assemble diverse groups in the vocal critique of neoliberalism and authoritarianism but involved them in discursive and spatial practices that countered their logic. It was an exercise in political participation and solidarity that valued intersectionality and mutual respect. It introduced many to the principles of non-hierarchical social organization for the first time and new and bottom-up conventions of decision-making. Finally, it was a situated experience of creating and protecting (with barricades) an urban commons where the logic of neoliberal enclosure of public spaces could be subverted, giving way to new forms of relationality among people and with the spaces they occupy. 

While these principles did not always perfectly translate into practices, Gezi offered a calisthenic experience of living democratically, and this was ultimately the event in the Sewellian sense described above. From neighborhood assembliesto producer cooperatives, from the Validebaǧ Defense Initiative to the continued struggle for Istanbul’s urban farms, it has had many afterlives. 

The earthquake zone in southern and southeastern Turkey is a new political space that offers similar opportunities for encounters, practices in non-hierarchical social organizing, and intersectional solidarity. Relief efforts led by small-scale organizations and self-organized collectives that involve locals in decision-making about how to organize their short- and long-term living spaces are crucial for grassroots organizing and recovery after the traumatic events. These projects aim not to produce electoral changes but to empower civil society against the government's top-down, profit-driven rebuilding schemes. 

In the days following the earthquake, I participated in earthquake solidarity efforts from Istanbul and on the ground in Malatya. Within and outside the disaster zone, self-organized networks comprising political activists, architects, chefs, urban planners, labor organizers, university students, local politicians, cultural associations, victims of the earthquakes, and others stepped in to compensate for the state's ineffective assistance. Because many volunteers came from outside the region, some of whom had never been to southeastern Turkey before, they encountered the poverty of infrastructure, the extent of policing and military violence, and the lack of public institutions in the region for the first time. In many cases, activists and organizers have decided to stay in the area long-term, building lasting alliances and friendships with locals. In turn, locals who have often felt marginalized by the cosmopolitan elite in western Turkey and Istanbul have come to see them differently. The earthquake zone has become a space of encounter, uniting the urban and provincial populations in anger, grief, and care. 

Like the protestors during the Gezi Park demonstrations, people in the earthquake zone—volunteers and locals—are joined by deep frustration and anger towards the state. AFAD, responsible for search-and-rescue operations and supporting survivors, faced criticism for its lack of preparedness and mishandling of the situation during the critical phase of the disaster. While thousands died under rubble due to the inadequacy of search-and-rescue teams, survivors were left without shelter and necessities for days. Additionally, there was anger directed at the state's efforts to hinder non-governmental organizations and aid trucks from reaching the earthquake-stricken areas. As the death toll stabilized a few days after the disaster, the focus of anger and frustration shifted toward the construction companies and the state itself. As Cihan Tuğal explains in his contribution to this roundtable, these entities had collaborated closely for years, prioritizing profit at the expense of human lives. 

Finally, the material devastation wrought by the earthquakes—as was the case during the Gezi Protests—has put the question of space at the center of politics. In Gezi, spatial politics were primarily dictated by what David Harvey called the “right to the city.” Its practices and vocabulary of dissent were shaped by other urban uprisings like Occupy Wallstreet, Tahrir Square Uprising, and Spain’s 15-M movement. In the post-earthquake context, the central political object is how to organize temporary housing for earthquake victims and how cities, towns, and villages will be rebuilt in the aftermath of the disaster. The struggle for space, especially in a post-disaster setting, is also about the future well-being of the urban and rural spaces in areas vulnerable to the crises wrought by anthropogenic climate change. To this end, post-disaster planning must involve a conversation about increasing this area’s resilience to rising temperatures, flash floods, and drought.  

Post-Disaster Planning: State-Capital Nexus 


The authoritarian and neoliberal reconstruction agenda of the AKP-led government in the earthquake zone is a continuation of the policies that had led to the Gezi Movement. There are two central issues: one, top-down decision-making, and two, the logic of profit over humans.

In the days following the initial search-and-rescue operations, building inspectors were dispatched to assess the extent of damage to individual structures. Unfortunately, the decision-making process behind these assessments remains shrouded in opacity, leaving ordinary people in the dark. Troublingly, residents of Malatya have reported receiving inaccurate damage reports for their homes. According to regulations, buildings deemed "heavy damage" are earmarked for demolition and reconstruction. However, it has come to light that some buildings with relatively low to medium-level damage have also been labeled as heavily damaged. This questionable practice seems to be concentrated primarily in Malatya's Alevi Kurdish neighborhoods, leading locals to suspect a deliberate agenda to disrupt and disperse these communities known for their opposition to the ruling party's politics and participation in the Kurdish movement.

After two weeks, the "Presidential Decree on Settlement and Construction Within the Scope of the State of Emergency" was issued. Following this, the government began the tender process for reconstruction. The Real Estate Investors’ Association (GYODER) volunteered to make a “master plan” for the entire area. Opting for negotiated rather than open tender, which means that only a select group of companies are allowed to enter the bidding and the process is not open to the public, areas in need of reconstruction were parceled out to massive construction companies like Kalyon, Kuzu Grup, Ege Yapı, Dome, Ant Yapı, and NKY. These companies have been awarded lucrative contracts for large-scale projects by the government in the past, with Kalyon (the company that built the new Istanbul Airport and Marmaray) ranking fifth among companies worldwide to receive the highest number of public tenders.  

The Presidential Decree not only denies public participation in decision-making processes but also removes the legal avenue for individuals to challenge potentially harmful projects and building decisions. This restrictive measure limits the ability of citizens to voice concerns and ensure that the reconstruction efforts prioritize safety and long-term well-being. The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, as well as the Chamber of Urban Planners, have raised significant concerns about the government's reconstruction plan, citing its rushed nature and disregard for expert advice. There is neither a process for institutional approval nor a period for public review of the proposed projects. 

Contested Spatial Imaginaries


Several months after the earthquakes, many organizations and collectives are working in the field to help advocate for impacted communities in the reconstruction process. While these efforts are not directly connected to the struggle at Gezi Park, it is nonetheless possible to draw a line connecting the experiments and practices that emerged ten years ago at Gezi Park and the bottom-up, sustainable, and human-centered architectural visions and urban defense initiatives arising from the earthquake zone. 

The KAF Collective arrived in the Dülkadiroğlu district of Kahramanmaraş a few days after the earthquakes. They initially set up a soup kitchen and depot in the backyard of Sümer Middle School, where a tent city was established for earthquake survivors in the Dülkadiroğlu district of Kahramanmaraş. They set up a water purification system and installed bathrooms to address the residents' most urgent needs. Collaborating with Architecture For All Association, they set out to build playgrounds for the over 250 displaced children in the area. In the construction, they attended to refurbishing and reusing furniture rather than new materials.  

Architecture for All Association initiated a post-disaster reconstruction project to establish a communal space—with indoor and outdoor areas—fostering social interaction among individuals affected by the earthquakes. This endeavor actively engages the local community in procuring materials for the construction and making decisions regarding the purpose and design of the gathering space. In doing so, it addresses a significant omission in the state's reconstruction plan, which predominantly emphasizes the development of private spaces. Furthermore, it challenges the underlying principles of the state's program, which relies heavily on private companies and top-down planning to rebuild the devastated cities. 

Umut Sendikası (Umut-Sen), an anti-capitalist labor collective, has been on the ground in Malatya, Samandaǧ, Elbistan, and other places since day one. At first, their efforts were directed at coordinating the distribution of clothing, food, water, and other necessities in city centers. In Malatya, they cooperated with the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association to open a soup kitchen and coordination center. Twice a day, volunteers provided hot food for upwards of 150 locals. Most importantly, they delivered necessities to villages distant from the urban center. Today, they continue providing goods to villages while organizing earthquake victims into associations based in the impacted cities. These assemblies bring together representatives from city neighborhoods and surrounding villages. Together, they can make collective demands on behalf of their localities and advocate for themselves in the reconstruction process.

Building collective power at this stage is essential for staging a struggle for more just and resilient urban planning in these cities, but it is not so simple. The earthquake area has been subject to a state of emergency, which means constant patrolling by the gendarme, police, and military forces. This creates an atmosphere of insecurity, which deters political participation by the locals. Furthermore, there are challenges surrounding the creation of inclusive spaces that can bring together the different linguistic groups that inhabit the area. There is potential for this in the self-organization of local communities. For instance, in Samandağ, women went on a protest walk on the 40th day after the earthquakes. There, they shouted slogans in Turkish and Arabic. However, on the whole, there remains little interaction between Arabic-speaking refugees and Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking local communities. Facilitating conversations and bringing these groups together in spaces of decision-making over the future of their cities is crucial to engendering solidarity between them.

Ultimately, the proliferation of contestation over how the earthquake zone is rebuilt is one of the most important political battles today. Beyond making earthquake-resilient architecture, it is vital to build cities that are resilient to flash floods and climate change. South and southeastern Turkey experience some of the highest temperatures across the country in the summer, which is projected to rise in the coming years and decades. It is thereby imperative that the new cities preserve and propagate green spaces rather than drown the cities in concrete. Furthermore, rubble disposal is a serious public health and environmental issue that needs consideration. While there is little to be done about the toxic dust that has been released into the atmosphere, unplanned disposal of rubble in the countryside could disrupt the ecosystem and poison the groundwater. The poisoning of the land also threatens the economic livelihood of the agricultural workers of this region. 

These are possible sites of political contestation for locals and left-leaning organizations across Turkey. The politicization of space—the struggle to create sustainable and durable urban and rural structures—is a critical element of delivering justice to the victims and survivors of the earthquake as well as engendering deeply rooted political change in the coming decades.

Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula Roundtable: Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia

[This is one of seven contributions in Jadaliyya`s electronic roundtable on the symbolic and material practices of knowledge production on the Arabian Peninsula. Moderated by Rosie Bsheer and John Warner, it features Toby Jones, Madawi Al-Rasheed, Adam Hanieh, Neha Vora, Nathalie Peutz, John Willis, and Ahmed Kanna.]

(1) Historically, what have the dominant analytical approaches to the study of the Arabian Peninsula been? How have the difficulties of carrying out research in the Arabian Peninsula shaped the ways in which knowledge is produced for the particular country/ies in which you have worked, and in the field more generally?

When I first began studying Arabic and, subsequently, formulating a research project in Yemen in the early 2000s, I did not consider myself to be working in or on the "Arabian Peninsula," as such. Rather, what drew me to Yemen was its historical, geographical, and cultural distinctiveness, which remains even now quite remarkable, but which nevertheless often obscures the relations, connections, and shared histories and presents that do exist within the region and beyond. This oversight is born perhaps out of what Sheila Carapico identified nearly ten years ago as a pernicious "dualism" that shaped not only American research agendas, but also the stereotypical conceptions, popular and academic, of "the Gulf" (rather than the peninsula as a whole): "Yemen is kaleidoscopic; the Gulf is monochrome…The Gulf is good for business; Yemen is good for ethnography" (Carapico 2004).

This same oversight—what Adam Hanieh in his response discusses as a "methodological nationalism"—is also born out of what we may call a secondary Orientalism: a way of "knowing" that considers the majority of the Arabian Peninsula without "culture" and without "history" in comparison to the Arab states of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. This fallacy has been exacerbated, of course, by the relative difficulty for short-term visitors and new scholars of actually engaging on a deeper level with the citizenry in countries like the United Arab Emirates, where it may be easier to befriend migrants from Egypt or Sri Lanka than its small minority of "nationals." As a result, although there have been notable exceptions—including recent scholarship on the political economy, political ecology, and youth and urban cultures in Saudi Arabia, in addition to an older, rich tradition of studies on kinship and its Bedouin—anthropological scholarship on Gulf-state citizens has seemed relatively flat in comparison to the "thicker" ethnographies of migrant populations in "the Gulf" and of "tribal" communities in Yemen. In both cases, these research foci emerge from the historically dominant approaches to these "two" areas: oil and security in the Gulf (and its resulting dependence on cheap, imported labor) and state-tribe relations in Yemen (and related studies on tribalism, sociality and gender). Nevertheless, they are also being productively complicated by theoretically informed analyses of space, political subjectivities, and belonging. A similar and amplified turn to non-labor migrant populations in the Gulf (as in the work of Mandana Limbert in Oman) and non-tribal populations in Yemen (such as Marina de Regt’s work on Ethiopian domestic workers or Susanne Dahlgren on the public sphere in Aden) remains welcome.

As for the difficulties in carrying out, rather than framing, research in the Arabian Peninsula, the challenges of conducting research in Yemen may be somewhat distinct. Adam Hanieh, Ahmed Kanna, Madawi Al-Rasheed and Neha Vora have touched on the lack of (Western) research institutes and networks in the Gulf, the dearth of statistical data, and the difficulty of gaining unmediated access. In Yemen, a robust network of foreign research institutes work in tandem with several Yemeni research and studies centers to house and fund scholars and to facilitate their research there. These include the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS), the French Center in Sana’a for Archaeology and Social Sciences (CEFAS), and the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). In the early 2000s, when I lived in Sanaa, these centers supported a vibrant research community of both foreign and Yemeni scholars who frequented their libraries and attended their talks. The deteriorating security situation in Yemen and the subsequent evaporation of US funding for in-country research has had an unfortunate impact on these centers, which, during my visits in recent years, have appeared particularly vacant. Still, even with this institutional support, it could be challenging to be an anthropologist in Yemen. For one, as Ahmed Kanna notes, anthropology is one of the less known and less understood of the social science disciplines. And when my Yemeni acquaintances did have an understanding of anthropology, they were also well aware and suspicious of its colonial and imperial legacy. This was made clear to me when a professor of anthropology at Sanaa University asked me in March 2003 in front of his class of students why the United States had not sent one hundred anthropologists to Iraq, instead of bombing it. Suspicion toward the discipline and a more general suspicion of foreign researchers as spies was not new. One only needs to read Steve Caton’s remarkable account of his arrest and imprisonment in 1980 to see what an effect such suspicions have had on the kind of knowledge that is produced. Indeed, in reflecting on his own encounter with the National Security in Raydah, Paul Dresch notes that it is often the most mundane of facts that are the most heavily guarded.

This was certainly true of my own experience of fieldwork in Socotra. Whereas I was made privy to various conspiracy theories, extra-marital affairs, secret religious conversions, etc.—all things I hesitated to take note of, much less write about—it was nearly impossible for me to ask my hosts quite straightforward questions about their genealogies, tribal structures, and political past. Of course, I was conducting research at a time when US presence in Iraq as well as in Yemen was acutely palpable. Moreover, it made little sense to my Socotran friends that a US student would receive funding to hang out in Socotra or anywhere else if she did not have significant ties to the political powers that be. As a result, I turned to and became more interested in Socotri poetry where people’s opinions, struggles, and contestations were more forcefully voiced. In so doing, I thus followed, or rather stumbled, in the footsteps of a group of scholars who work on poetry in Yemen, including Steve Caton, Flagg Miller, Lucine Taminian and Samuel Liebhaber, but without their expertise! Fortunately, such suspicions do ease over time. Although it has become even more difficult in the past five years for anthropologists to conduct fieldwork in Yemen, now that I live in Abu Dhabi where I am easily accessible by telephone and where my current position is more comprehensible to my Socotran interlocutors, Socotrans are more comfortable reaching out to me, calling upon me for help, and working with me. I know that if I were to have the chance to return again for a lengthy period of time, fieldwork—in terms of the questions I could ask and the answers I would receive—would be very different this time.

(2) What are some of the new and innovative ways of thinking and theorizing the Arabian Peninsula and how has your work drawn on these approaches? How do these new theoretical interventions address elisions or tensions within more traditional approaches?

In my view, one of the most useful attempts to reframe and theorize the Arabian Peninsula occurred with the 2004 publication of Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (edited by Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis). It is here that Sheila Carapico issued her "Arabia Incognita: An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies" cited above. Carapico’s is a research agenda that would bridge the conventional divide between Yemeni and Gulf Studies to focus on the interconnections between the inhabitants and nations of the peninsula as a whole. Whether in direct response to Carapico’s invitation or in reaction to the region’s most recent and emblematic transnational phenomena, such as the global “war on terror,” the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the spread of the Arab uprisings, several scholars and even academic journals have now taken up this call. For example, in the past two years we have seen the 2011 launch of the Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea followed by, in 2013, the conversion and expansion of the journal Chroniques yéménites into Arabian Humanities: International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula, both focused on the Arabian Peninsula en bloc and from antiquity to present.

What is needed when it comes to theorizing the Arabian Peninsula, however, is not just an expansion of scope—a sort of micro "area studies"—but also scholarship that explicitly draws on and forwards this transnational and interdisciplinary peninsular perspective. This approach breaks with the traditional dualism described above in its recognition that one cannot adequately study migration, religious reformism, sectarian identities, state and popular (or cultural) sovereignty, youth cultures, urbanism, natural resource exploitation and conservation, gender transformations, heritage production, or class, etc., within one nation without at least recognizing the influences and entanglements of these phenomena throughout the peninsula and across its surrounding waters. New scholarship that exemplifies this approach includes, of course, Engseng Ho’s work on Hadhrami migration; Adam Hanieh’s work on transregional (Khaleeji) capital and class formation; Laurent Bonnefoy’s work on Salafism in Yemen (and yet highly contingent upon grassroots flows to and from Saudi Arabia); Steve Caton’s emerging research on water scarcity in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Andrew Gardner’s comparative studies of the kafala system in Bahrain and Qatar, among others.

Even in a relatively "remote" and off-shore location such as Socotra, this "peninsular" perspective is imperative to an understanding of the "local" and of how Socotra has been produced recently as a World Heritage Site and a "natural" biodiverse research laboratory. Yet, in the early stages of my research on the development, conservation, and heritagization of Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago, and perhaps due to the pervasiveness of the distinctions drawn between Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, I was surprised by the degree to which my Socotran friends and neighbors were oriented not toward Sanaa or Aden, but rather toward Salalah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Sharjah, Bani Yas, and Jeddah. It was the cities and representations of "the Gulf" and Saudi Arabia—not mainland Yemen—which captured their imaginations and fueled their aspirations. Indeed, I soon learned that I could not examine heritage production in Socotra—conventionally understood to be a "national" project—without first examining heritage projects and discourses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. For example, the annual Festival of the Socotran Poet which, as I wrote about in MERIP last May, was transformed in 2012 into a platform for public debate on the viability of Socotra’s cultural and political sovereignty, was originally modeled after the United Arab Emirates’ reality television show, The Million’s Poet, created by the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (now the Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority) to promote and safeguard national Emirati culture. This small example demonstrates to me the importance of seeing and understanding the peninsula holistically instead of continuing to bifurcate it into Yemen and the rest.

This is not to say, however, that the space and study of the Arabian Peninsula is any more "natural" than are the constructed borders of its nation-states. I agree with Toby Jones and John Willis’ deep reservations about area studies and about the "Arabian Peninsula" as yet another imperially produced category. As well as they state it here, these reservations are, of course, not new. And yet, as all of the contributors to this roundtable point out or imply, the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf—Yemen, too (hence Lisa Wedeen’s book title, Peripheral Visions)—have long been treated as peripheral, geographically and conceptually, to the Middle East and to Middle East studies. One only needs to look through the bibliography of Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar’s excellent review article, "Anthropologies of Arab-Majority Societies," to note that ethnographies and anthropological articles situated in Egypt or in Palestine far outnumber the recent scholarship produced on all of the Arabian Peninsula states combined. There is thus obviously no a priori reason to theorize the "Arabian Peninsula"—but we may still learn a lot in doing so.

Here, at New York University in Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), Pascal Ménoret, Justin Stearns, and I were hired into a nascent program named "Arab Crossroads Studies." During our first year teaching at NYUAD, we spent many hours debating both the merits and productivity of the name and the rationale for turning this then-concentration into a full-fledged undergraduate major. The legacy of US area studies’ Cold War roots was something we took seriously. What does "Arab Crossroads" even mean? And was it productive or just as flawed to move from a geographic focus, that is, Middle East studies, to a linguistic, cultural, and ethnic one: the Arab world? Even as these are questions we continue to ask, the renaming and reframing does something. If nothing else, it reminds me as a scholar and a teacher to focus more explicitly on the historical, political, economic, and social connections between the "Arab world" and its immediate surroundings (Africa, South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Europe) as well as on the human, material, and conceptual "crossroads" within "it." In doing so, it draws our attention away from place and toward movement across space and within various spaces.

In treating the Arabian Peninsula as a "center" rather than a periphery, we are forced to widen our geographical focus and broaden our conceptual one. That is, we cannot design classes or research projects as if the "Arab world" or the "Middle East" begins in Morocco and ends in Muscat. Nor can we ignore the capital and labor flows that link South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant (and also to the United States). Finally, as Tom Looser has convincingly argued, it is with the export of Western universities and branch campuses to the Gulf and East Asia, for example, that area studies gains new salience. With the fashionable emphasis today on all things "global," a critical area studies approach can ground and situate an otherwise imperialist (and predominantly Western) sense of "global" knowledge and "cosmopolitan" belonging. Through the newly established "Arab Crossroads Studies" major at NYUAD, we seek to emphasize to our "global" students that their being here, in Abu Dhabi—in the Arabian Peninsula—does matter and that Abu Dhabi is not merely the "global" city it aspires to be, but that it, too, has been historically and politically produced. Included, however, among the required courses for all undergraduate majors is a "Problems and Methods in Arab Crossroads Studies" course: a course that examines area, area studies, and areas like the "Arabian Peninsula" critically, while asking what new theoretical interventions such a focus may uncover. We welcome further discussion on this!

(3) "Sectarianism" seems to have reemerged in popular and academic work on the Arabian Peninsula as both the label for and analytic of a socio-political phenomenon. What is the utility of both past and more recent formulations of "sectarianism" as an analytical tool for the study of the Arabian Peninsula? What challenges or problems have these formulations created?

This is an important question.  As I have not worked on sectarianism directly, however, I will defer here to the other roundtable participants.

(4) What is the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics in the United States, Western Europe, Russia, etc.? What kind of attention has been given to local and regional knowledge production, if any?

I think it fair to say that the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics from the outside is growing stronger, while still remaining contingent upon or even hampered by the hegemonic status of English as the scholarly lingua franca. We see this even in the shift from French- and German-language publications to English-language ones. Serious scholarship produced by "Western" academics does rely on local scholarship and knowledge production, but more can and should be done to translate these works to make them more widely accessible. For example, I recently assigned Ahmed Kanna’s Dubai: The City as Corporation to my students at NYUAD. Kanna draws heavily and productively on the writings of Emirati scholar Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah, thereby introducing his important work to Kanna’s English-language readership. As the majority of Abdullah’s articles have been published in Arabic, however, I am less able to assign them directly, meaning that "local" scholarship, like his, may be in danger of being presented or perceived as secondary to the English-language publications that build upon it.

Similarly, in my work on Socotra, I draw considerably on the texts written and published by the Socotran historian Ahmed al-Anbali (who resides in the United Arab Emirates), as well as on knowledge production by non-academics. The latter include Socotran guides, heritage brokers, and activists who, in response to and as a rejection of the international regime of "experts," are now fashioning themselves as what one may call "para-experts," engaged in an explicit and self-aware counter-form of knowledge production. Although I am mostly interested in the development and deployment of this parallel expertise (as opposed to the content itself), it remains a challenge to adequately present this knowledge production as scholarship and not just as ethnographic artifact. This is due in great part to what John Willis identifies as the incommensurable position of Yemeni academics in terms of their institutional and financial support and the different intellectual and political project in which they are engaged. Until recently, Socotran scholars were eager to promote a narrative of Socotran unity, stability, and exceptionalism. This has started to change, however, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which have opened a space for more critical histories to be told.

Finally, as someone teaching at a US institution of higher education in the Gulf, I should say something about intellectual exchange and the proliferation of Western branch campuses mentioned by Al-Rasheed, Hanieh, and Vora. Madawi Al-Rasheed expresses concern that Western academic institutions (not just in the Gulf, but also in the West) may be forced through their funding sources to engage in self-censorship, if not the kind of outright censorship that occurred when Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen was denied entry into the United Arab Emirates for a conference sponsored by the London School of Economics this past March. Adam Hanieh questions whether these institutions will reproduce dominant narratives about the Middle East and both Hanieh and Neha Vora raise the specter of their financial motives. It is undeniable that there are restrictions on academic freedom in these places—as there are in the United States and in Western Europe, especially when it comes to untenured faculty. Here at NYUAD we are guaranteed academic freedom in the classroom and within the institution more broadly, as long as we do not criticize the ruling families or Islam. Critics of these institutions perceive this as a profound infringement upon academic freedom and knowledge production. On the other hand, my students—Emirati, Filipino, American, and Palestinian—are reading and discussing Yasser Elsheshtawy, Andrew Gardner, Ahmed Kanna, and Neha Vora on structural violence, labor regimes, citizen-foreigner relations, and the politics of race, class, and space in the Gulf. In history classes, such as the ones taught by Pascal Ménoret, students are reading Madawi Al-Rasheed, Mamoun Fandy, Stephen Hertog, Toby Jones, Amelie Le Renard, Timothy Mitchell, and Robert Vitalis on resource extraction, corporate capitalism, imperialism, authoritarianism, political protest, and gender in the Arabian Peninsula. If our collective efforts to "theorize the Arabian Peninsula" take root, it will be in universities like NYUAD where students are eager to engage these analyses. This is only one way, but an important one, of creating a new generation of critical scholars and also of developing spaces of inquiry in which "local" scholarship is given serious attention within "Western" universities.

(5) Some argue that the Arab Uprisings changed the ways in which the Middle East can and will be studied. What has been the immediate impact of the Arab uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula and what are likely to be the long-term effects?

The immediate impact of the uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula has been an increased attention to both the transnational reverberations of these events and their antecedents—the politics of sectarianism in and across Arabian Peninsula states, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the peninsula, the impact of social media transnationally, etc. Another result seems to be a renewed attention to various modes of sovereignty—state, popular, cultural—and its contestations. What may and hopefully will emerge with this, then, is the more thorough replacement of the Orientalist notion of "Gulf" states and societies as monolitihic and monochrome sites with a "thicker" understanding of the richness and complexities that underpins each Arabian Peninsula state individually and in relation to one another. To paraphrase Sheila Carapico, it should now become increasingly obvious that the entire Arabian Peninsula "is good for ethnography"—or, more importantly, that it deserves and requires a broader group of scholars’ critical attention.

Ultimately, the proliferation of contestation over how the earthquake zone is rebuilt is one of the most important political battles today.

 


Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula
electronic roundtable contributions:

Thinking Globally About Arabia by Toby C. Jones.

Knowledge in the Time of Oil by Madawi Al-Rasheed.

Capital and Labor in Gulf States: Bringing the Region Back In by Adam Hanieh.

Unpacking Knowledge Production and Consumption by Neha Vora.

Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia by Nathalie Peutz. 

Writing Histories of the Arabian Peninsula or How to Narrate the Past of a (Non)Place by John Willis.

Towards a Critical Cartography of the Political in the Arabian Peninsula by Ahmed Kanna.