Global Geopolitics of the Western Sahara: Beyond Dominant Narratives on the Western Sahara Roundtable

[Gathering of Saharawi troops, near Tifariti (Western Sahara), celebrating the 32nd anniversary ot the Polisario Front. Image by Saharauiak/Flickr.] [Gathering of Saharawi troops, near Tifariti (Western Sahara), celebrating the 32nd anniversary ot the Polisario Front. Image by Saharauiak/Flickr.]

Global Geopolitics of the Western Sahara: Beyond Dominant Narratives on the Western Sahara Roundtable

By : Allison L McManus

[This is one of seven pieces in Jadaliyya`s electronic roundtable on the Western Sahara. Moderated by Samia Errazzouki and Allison L. McManus, it features contributions from John P. EntelisStephen ZunesAboubakr Jamaï, Ali AnouzlaAllison L. McManusSamia Errazzouki, and Andrew McConnell.]

Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

 – Article 5, UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 

In an ideal world, the United Nations would serve as the foremost institution in the preservation of international law and human rights to a dignified life. However, the reality of global governance is that it is more often dominated by the supremacy of geopolitical rule. This supremacy became painfully clear this week as the United States waffled in its support for human rights monitoring in Western Sahara. While the United States initially supported a resolution that would call for UN monitoring and reporting on the situation of human rights in the region, it retracted its support following a strong response from Morocco and the unannounced cancellation of joint military operations. The new resolution will extend UN peacekeeping presence, but without the additional human rights monitoring. Despite the implicit commitment to human rights as a member of the UN Security Council, despite myriad allegations of human rights abuses in the region, and despite the recognition of a right of a people to self-determination as protected by international law, US political interests have resulted in the abandonment of proper measures to ensure that a very minimum of human rights standards are upheld in this region.

A Brief History of Decolonization in the Western Sahara

Prior to colonization, the areas now known as Morocco and the Western Sahara were composed of mostly tribal peoples ruled by a sultan. The sultan ruled from the northern part of Morocco and tribes generally swore allegiance as a part of the bled makhzen or bled siba, based not on territorial boundaries but on oaths of allegiance. In 1906 the region was colonized and divided between France and Spain, during which time the sultan’s sovereignty was technically respected in the protectorate. When Morocco won independence from France, the independence of the Western Sahara region under Spanish rule was not recognized, and King Mohammed V proclaimed Morocco’s decolonization incomplete. Upon creation of the United Nations Special Commission on Decolonization in 1963, the Western Sahara was listed as a “non-self-governing territory,” a designation which it retains today. 

By the mid-1970s conflict over sovereignty in the region had intensified. Morocco under King Hassan II continued to claim the territory as rightfully part of Morocco based on the pre-colonial tribal allegiances, and Spain maintained its sovereignty based on its claim that the land was terra nullius, or uninhabited territory, prior to colonization. During the time of Spanish colonization, the Sahrawi peoples represented by the liberation movement Frente popular para la Liberación de Saguiat El Hamra y de Rio de Oro (the POLISARIO Front) also emerged, claiming their right to sovereignty in the territory. This group resisted claims by both Spain and Morocco in Western Sahara and engaged in armed conflicts against both nations. A 1974 UN mission found popular support for this movement, pushing Morocco to the brink of war. To avoid a further intensification of conflict all parties agreed to a consultation with the International Court of Justice to help determine claims to the territory.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was asked to offer an advisory opinion on the status of the territory as terra nullius prior to the Spanish occupation, and to determine if any ties that Morocco had in the region that would establish its sovereignty. The ICJ findings established that the land was inhabited prior to colonization and thus not terra nullius, but that Morocco’s contiguous sovereignty could not be established, although it did allow that some ties of allegiance could be established. Morocco interpreted these ties as justification for the Green March in November 1975, where three hundred fifty thousand civilians and eighty thousand troops entered the region, declaring it a part of Morocco. Although Spain had not formally transferred sovereignty, Spanish claims to the territory were rescinded and less than a week after the march a treaty was signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania that recognized Morocco’s right to rule in Western Sahara. This act was in blatant violation of UN resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization and has not been recognized by the UN as having changed the status of the Western Sahara. Several months after the Madrid Treaty, the POLISARIO declared independence from Morocco and declared the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Armed conflict continued until a UN brokered ceasefire in 1991, and while Morocco administers some areas of the territory, to date there has been no resolution to the question of internationally recognized governance in the region. 

Challenges to “Self-Determination”

The ICJ opinion exposed the insufficiency of the UN resolution on decolonization to adequately reconcile the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. Ultimately, while determining that “some” legal ties existed between Morocco and “some” of the tribes of Western Sahara, these were not substantive enough to conclude that Morocco had a legal claim to sovereignty in the territory based on the requirements of the UN resolution.

Also, this decision revealed the rigid position of the right to self-determination in the resolution. The UN resolution privileges a declaration of independence over a decision to integrate with an existing state. To establish independence requires only the expression of the will of the people. However, to establish integration with another state requires universal adult suffrage and democratic election. This stance initially served as a safeguard to ensure that the colonized population could not be manipulated; however in the instance of Western Sahara it has compounded the complicated process of establishing legitimate authority. Various factors - population displacement during the period of Spanish colonial rule and the subsequent conflicts, the fluid nature of tribal migration, and resistance from Morocco and the POLISARIO in facilitating a UN referendum – have thus far made determining the free will of the people through referendum an impossible task.   

Supremacy of Geopolitics 

Morocco’s rejection of any plan that allows for even a possibility of independence, even for a portion of the territory, and the broader impasse in negotiations reveal the geopolitical currents that underlie the process of decolonization. International law stipulates the necessity for immediate steps to be taken on a referendum to determine the will of the people of Western Sahara – that much has been established since the original UN declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by resolution 1514 (XV). At the present date, over fifty years later, and after multiple resolutions formally stating the need for a solution, it is clear that the authority of these conventions is tenuous at best and that they have most certainly been open to geopolitical interpretation.

Morocco’s political position can best be understood as one of preservation of rule; this has been characteristic of both the current monarch, Mohammed VI and the previous, Hassan II, who both organized their regimes to centralize power in the seat of the monarchy. During the period of colonization a strong sense of nationalism and allegiance to the king developed in the face of a foreign occupation. The king’s stance on Western Sahara adopted a nationalist rhetoric of reunification of the Moroccan state and strong resistance to Algeria’s support for the POLISARIO. Thus, the language of the constitution refers to the king as “the Supreme Representative of the State, Symbol of the unity of the nation, Guarantor of state continuity and sustainability.” Perhaps more importantly, as was highlighted in recent Wikileaks cables from the Kissinger era, the presence of significant phosphate reserves in the Western Sahara make this area especially economically valuable. Morocco is one of the world’s largest exporters of phosphates, and most phosphate mines are owned by Groupe Omnium Nord-Africain—in which the royal family is one of the largest shareholders.

International Involvement 

Since the signing of the Madrid Treaty, the European nations have wavered between silence on the status of Western Sahara and outright support for Morocco’s claim. France has historically been the most supportive, providing Morocco with arms used in the conflict, and in 2001 President Jacques Chirac referenced Western Sahara as “the southern provinces of Morocco.” This outright support is undoubtedly linked to the political interests of the European nations, as Morocco has supplied reserves of cheap immigrant labor and mineral resources – primarily the aforementioned phosphates. 

The official US position on the conflict has been in support of autonomy for the region under Moroccan sovereignty. Aside from holding modest economic stakes through a free trade agreement, the US support for Morocco’s claim hinges on the role Morocco plays in the US War on Terror. The United States provides Morocco military aid to suppress potentially violent radical Islamist groups in the region, and thus serves as a critical entrée for the United States into the Maghreb and Sahel in combatting Al Qaeda. This role carries even greater significance due to recent increased violence from Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM); recent reports suggest that AQIM may be moving into the Algerian refugee camps. Additionally, Morocco has allowed for US extra-judicial detention centers on its soil. One of these is the Temara detention center, where former prisoner Binyam Mohamed claims he was brutally tortured.

The political ties between the Western powers and Morocco have resulted in a stalemate in a referendum on self-determination, and subsequently a halt in negotiations on a resolution to the conflict. Because the UN resolution on decolonization privileges a desire for independence over integration Morocco has refused to agree to a referendum that would allow for even the option to choose full independence, and because the United States and the EU are hesitant to disrupt ties with Morocco, the stalemate seems to be the solution that is most acceptable to all parties. Despite the continued requests of the United Nations to find a solution that includes the will of the Sahrawi people, the last significant step towards progress came in 1991, when the United Nations brokered a ceasefire and created MINURSO.

Towards a More Humane Solution in Western Sahara?

Despite the lack of attention in most mainstream media, the case of Western Sahara is a very real and deeply troubling situation with high economic costs, and incredibly high costs for human rights. A report from the International Crisis Group reveals that nearly all Sahrawi families have lost a member or been separated because of the conflict. Untold tens, or perhaps hundreds of thousands have been living in refugee camps for decades in one of the least inhabitable areas on earth; because the UN cannot conduct its own census, aid programs must estimate the number of refugees and there is literally no way to know if enough food and supplies are provided. The nomadic peoples that live outside of the camps are exposed to the presence of landmines used during the conflict. Activists that advocate for the independence of Western Sahara, or even have vague relation to the POLISARIO, and even journalists attempting to raise awareness are met with disproportionate use of force or enter the ranks of the hundreds of “disappeared” peoples held and often tortured in detention centers. After a wave of protests in 2010, Moroccan security forces attacked the Gdeim Izik Sahrawi camp, resulting in eleven deaths (according to the most conservative estimate of the Moroccan government). Ironically, the marginalization may even have negative effects for security in the region, as POLISARIO members could resort to greater violence in their effort for recognition; some factions have recently been reported to have joined forces with AQIM. 

Clearly, a new framework is needed to reconcile the common goals of prosperity and security with a political reality that allows for such heinous injustice. This framework might be envisioned in two ways: what professor Richard Falk calls that of necessity, the bare minimum that would need to be accomplished to ensure respect for human rights, or desire, the best-case-scenario for a humane global reality. Either would need to take into account the stumbling blocks of the privileged positions of Western approaches to self-determination and geopolitics. To travel towards a desirable resolution requires a solution that encompasses much greater structural changes. Whether or not this framework might become not a hopeful possibility but a feasible solution will depend largely on both the US commitment as an equal participant in a democratic United Nations, and a tangible commitment to the ensuring the right for all humanity to live in peace, security and prosperity. 

[Click here to read the introduction or read other contributions.]

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Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula Roundtable: Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia

[This is one of seven contributions in Jadaliyya`s electronic roundtable on the symbolic and material practices of knowledge production on the Arabian Peninsula. Moderated by Rosie Bsheer and John Warner, it features Toby Jones, Madawi Al-Rasheed, Adam Hanieh, Neha Vora, Nathalie Peutz, John Willis, and Ahmed Kanna.]

(1) Historically, what have the dominant analytical approaches to the study of the Arabian Peninsula been? How have the difficulties of carrying out research in the Arabian Peninsula shaped the ways in which knowledge is produced for the particular country/ies in which you have worked, and in the field more generally?

When I first began studying Arabic and, subsequently, formulating a research project in Yemen in the early 2000s, I did not consider myself to be working in or on the "Arabian Peninsula," as such. Rather, what drew me to Yemen was its historical, geographical, and cultural distinctiveness, which remains even now quite remarkable, but which nevertheless often obscures the relations, connections, and shared histories and presents that do exist within the region and beyond. This oversight is born perhaps out of what Sheila Carapico identified nearly ten years ago as a pernicious "dualism" that shaped not only American research agendas, but also the stereotypical conceptions, popular and academic, of "the Gulf" (rather than the peninsula as a whole): "Yemen is kaleidoscopic; the Gulf is monochrome…The Gulf is good for business; Yemen is good for ethnography" (Carapico 2004).

This same oversight—what Adam Hanieh in his response discusses as a "methodological nationalism"—is also born out of what we may call a secondary Orientalism: a way of "knowing" that considers the majority of the Arabian Peninsula without "culture" and without "history" in comparison to the Arab states of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. This fallacy has been exacerbated, of course, by the relative difficulty for short-term visitors and new scholars of actually engaging on a deeper level with the citizenry in countries like the United Arab Emirates, where it may be easier to befriend migrants from Egypt or Sri Lanka than its small minority of "nationals." As a result, although there have been notable exceptions—including recent scholarship on the political economy, political ecology, and youth and urban cultures in Saudi Arabia, in addition to an older, rich tradition of studies on kinship and its Bedouin—anthropological scholarship on Gulf-state citizens has seemed relatively flat in comparison to the "thicker" ethnographies of migrant populations in "the Gulf" and of "tribal" communities in Yemen. In both cases, these research foci emerge from the historically dominant approaches to these "two" areas: oil and security in the Gulf (and its resulting dependence on cheap, imported labor) and state-tribe relations in Yemen (and related studies on tribalism, sociality and gender). Nevertheless, they are also being productively complicated by theoretically informed analyses of space, political subjectivities, and belonging. A similar and amplified turn to non-labor migrant populations in the Gulf (as in the work of Mandana Limbert in Oman) and non-tribal populations in Yemen (such as Marina de Regt’s work on Ethiopian domestic workers or Susanne Dahlgren on the public sphere in Aden) remains welcome.

As for the difficulties in carrying out, rather than framing, research in the Arabian Peninsula, the challenges of conducting research in Yemen may be somewhat distinct. Adam Hanieh, Ahmed Kanna, Madawi Al-Rasheed and Neha Vora have touched on the lack of (Western) research institutes and networks in the Gulf, the dearth of statistical data, and the difficulty of gaining unmediated access. In Yemen, a robust network of foreign research institutes work in tandem with several Yemeni research and studies centers to house and fund scholars and to facilitate their research there. These include the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS), the French Center in Sana’a for Archaeology and Social Sciences (CEFAS), and the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). In the early 2000s, when I lived in Sanaa, these centers supported a vibrant research community of both foreign and Yemeni scholars who frequented their libraries and attended their talks. The deteriorating security situation in Yemen and the subsequent evaporation of US funding for in-country research has had an unfortunate impact on these centers, which, during my visits in recent years, have appeared particularly vacant. Still, even with this institutional support, it could be challenging to be an anthropologist in Yemen. For one, as Ahmed Kanna notes, anthropology is one of the less known and less understood of the social science disciplines. And when my Yemeni acquaintances did have an understanding of anthropology, they were also well aware and suspicious of its colonial and imperial legacy. This was made clear to me when a professor of anthropology at Sanaa University asked me in March 2003 in front of his class of students why the United States had not sent one hundred anthropologists to Iraq, instead of bombing it. Suspicion toward the discipline and a more general suspicion of foreign researchers as spies was not new. One only needs to read Steve Caton’s remarkable account of his arrest and imprisonment in 1980 to see what an effect such suspicions have had on the kind of knowledge that is produced. Indeed, in reflecting on his own encounter with the National Security in Raydah, Paul Dresch notes that it is often the most mundane of facts that are the most heavily guarded.

This was certainly true of my own experience of fieldwork in Socotra. Whereas I was made privy to various conspiracy theories, extra-marital affairs, secret religious conversions, etc.—all things I hesitated to take note of, much less write about—it was nearly impossible for me to ask my hosts quite straightforward questions about their genealogies, tribal structures, and political past. Of course, I was conducting research at a time when US presence in Iraq as well as in Yemen was acutely palpable. Moreover, it made little sense to my Socotran friends that a US student would receive funding to hang out in Socotra or anywhere else if she did not have significant ties to the political powers that be. As a result, I turned to and became more interested in Socotri poetry where people’s opinions, struggles, and contestations were more forcefully voiced. In so doing, I thus followed, or rather stumbled, in the footsteps of a group of scholars who work on poetry in Yemen, including Steve Caton, Flagg Miller, Lucine Taminian and Samuel Liebhaber, but without their expertise! Fortunately, such suspicions do ease over time. Although it has become even more difficult in the past five years for anthropologists to conduct fieldwork in Yemen, now that I live in Abu Dhabi where I am easily accessible by telephone and where my current position is more comprehensible to my Socotran interlocutors, Socotrans are more comfortable reaching out to me, calling upon me for help, and working with me. I know that if I were to have the chance to return again for a lengthy period of time, fieldwork—in terms of the questions I could ask and the answers I would receive—would be very different this time.

(2) What are some of the new and innovative ways of thinking and theorizing the Arabian Peninsula and how has your work drawn on these approaches? How do these new theoretical interventions address elisions or tensions within more traditional approaches?

In my view, one of the most useful attempts to reframe and theorize the Arabian Peninsula occurred with the 2004 publication of Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (edited by Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis). It is here that Sheila Carapico issued her "Arabia Incognita: An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies" cited above. Carapico’s is a research agenda that would bridge the conventional divide between Yemeni and Gulf Studies to focus on the interconnections between the inhabitants and nations of the peninsula as a whole. Whether in direct response to Carapico’s invitation or in reaction to the region’s most recent and emblematic transnational phenomena, such as the global “war on terror,” the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the spread of the Arab uprisings, several scholars and even academic journals have now taken up this call. For example, in the past two years we have seen the 2011 launch of the Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea followed by, in 2013, the conversion and expansion of the journal Chroniques yéménites into Arabian Humanities: International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula, both focused on the Arabian Peninsula en bloc and from antiquity to present.

What is needed when it comes to theorizing the Arabian Peninsula, however, is not just an expansion of scope—a sort of micro "area studies"—but also scholarship that explicitly draws on and forwards this transnational and interdisciplinary peninsular perspective. This approach breaks with the traditional dualism described above in its recognition that one cannot adequately study migration, religious reformism, sectarian identities, state and popular (or cultural) sovereignty, youth cultures, urbanism, natural resource exploitation and conservation, gender transformations, heritage production, or class, etc., within one nation without at least recognizing the influences and entanglements of these phenomena throughout the peninsula and across its surrounding waters. New scholarship that exemplifies this approach includes, of course, Engseng Ho’s work on Hadhrami migration; Adam Hanieh’s work on transregional (Khaleeji) capital and class formation; Laurent Bonnefoy’s work on Salafism in Yemen (and yet highly contingent upon grassroots flows to and from Saudi Arabia); Steve Caton’s emerging research on water scarcity in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Andrew Gardner’s comparative studies of the kafala system in Bahrain and Qatar, among others.

Even in a relatively "remote" and off-shore location such as Socotra, this "peninsular" perspective is imperative to an understanding of the "local" and of how Socotra has been produced recently as a World Heritage Site and a "natural" biodiverse research laboratory. Yet, in the early stages of my research on the development, conservation, and heritagization of Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago, and perhaps due to the pervasiveness of the distinctions drawn between Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, I was surprised by the degree to which my Socotran friends and neighbors were oriented not toward Sanaa or Aden, but rather toward Salalah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Sharjah, Bani Yas, and Jeddah. It was the cities and representations of "the Gulf" and Saudi Arabia—not mainland Yemen—which captured their imaginations and fueled their aspirations. Indeed, I soon learned that I could not examine heritage production in Socotra—conventionally understood to be a "national" project—without first examining heritage projects and discourses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. For example, the annual Festival of the Socotran Poet which, as I wrote about in MERIP last May, was transformed in 2012 into a platform for public debate on the viability of Socotra’s cultural and political sovereignty, was originally modeled after the United Arab Emirates’ reality television show, The Million’s Poet, created by the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (now the Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority) to promote and safeguard national Emirati culture. This small example demonstrates to me the importance of seeing and understanding the peninsula holistically instead of continuing to bifurcate it into Yemen and the rest.

This is not to say, however, that the space and study of the Arabian Peninsula is any more "natural" than are the constructed borders of its nation-states. I agree with Toby Jones and John Willis’ deep reservations about area studies and about the "Arabian Peninsula" as yet another imperially produced category. As well as they state it here, these reservations are, of course, not new. And yet, as all of the contributors to this roundtable point out or imply, the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf—Yemen, too (hence Lisa Wedeen’s book title, Peripheral Visions)—have long been treated as peripheral, geographically and conceptually, to the Middle East and to Middle East studies. One only needs to look through the bibliography of Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar’s excellent review article, "Anthropologies of Arab-Majority Societies," to note that ethnographies and anthropological articles situated in Egypt or in Palestine far outnumber the recent scholarship produced on all of the Arabian Peninsula states combined. There is thus obviously no a priori reason to theorize the "Arabian Peninsula"—but we may still learn a lot in doing so.

Here, at New York University in Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), Pascal Ménoret, Justin Stearns, and I were hired into a nascent program named "Arab Crossroads Studies." During our first year teaching at NYUAD, we spent many hours debating both the merits and productivity of the name and the rationale for turning this then-concentration into a full-fledged undergraduate major. The legacy of US area studies’ Cold War roots was something we took seriously. What does "Arab Crossroads" even mean? And was it productive or just as flawed to move from a geographic focus, that is, Middle East studies, to a linguistic, cultural, and ethnic one: the Arab world? Even as these are questions we continue to ask, the renaming and reframing does something. If nothing else, it reminds me as a scholar and a teacher to focus more explicitly on the historical, political, economic, and social connections between the "Arab world" and its immediate surroundings (Africa, South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Europe) as well as on the human, material, and conceptual "crossroads" within "it." In doing so, it draws our attention away from place and toward movement across space and within various spaces.

In treating the Arabian Peninsula as a "center" rather than a periphery, we are forced to widen our geographical focus and broaden our conceptual one. That is, we cannot design classes or research projects as if the "Arab world" or the "Middle East" begins in Morocco and ends in Muscat. Nor can we ignore the capital and labor flows that link South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant (and also to the United States). Finally, as Tom Looser has convincingly argued, it is with the export of Western universities and branch campuses to the Gulf and East Asia, for example, that area studies gains new salience. With the fashionable emphasis today on all things "global," a critical area studies approach can ground and situate an otherwise imperialist (and predominantly Western) sense of "global" knowledge and "cosmopolitan" belonging. Through the newly established "Arab Crossroads Studies" major at NYUAD, we seek to emphasize to our "global" students that their being here, in Abu Dhabi—in the Arabian Peninsula—does matter and that Abu Dhabi is not merely the "global" city it aspires to be, but that it, too, has been historically and politically produced. Included, however, among the required courses for all undergraduate majors is a "Problems and Methods in Arab Crossroads Studies" course: a course that examines area, area studies, and areas like the "Arabian Peninsula" critically, while asking what new theoretical interventions such a focus may uncover. We welcome further discussion on this!

(3) "Sectarianism" seems to have reemerged in popular and academic work on the Arabian Peninsula as both the label for and analytic of a socio-political phenomenon. What is the utility of both past and more recent formulations of "sectarianism" as an analytical tool for the study of the Arabian Peninsula? What challenges or problems have these formulations created?

This is an important question.  As I have not worked on sectarianism directly, however, I will defer here to the other roundtable participants.

(4) What is the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics in the United States, Western Europe, Russia, etc.? What kind of attention has been given to local and regional knowledge production, if any?

I think it fair to say that the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics from the outside is growing stronger, while still remaining contingent upon or even hampered by the hegemonic status of English as the scholarly lingua franca. We see this even in the shift from French- and German-language publications to English-language ones. Serious scholarship produced by "Western" academics does rely on local scholarship and knowledge production, but more can and should be done to translate these works to make them more widely accessible. For example, I recently assigned Ahmed Kanna’s Dubai: The City as Corporation to my students at NYUAD. Kanna draws heavily and productively on the writings of Emirati scholar Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah, thereby introducing his important work to Kanna’s English-language readership. As the majority of Abdullah’s articles have been published in Arabic, however, I am less able to assign them directly, meaning that "local" scholarship, like his, may be in danger of being presented or perceived as secondary to the English-language publications that build upon it.

Similarly, in my work on Socotra, I draw considerably on the texts written and published by the Socotran historian Ahmed al-Anbali (who resides in the United Arab Emirates), as well as on knowledge production by non-academics. The latter include Socotran guides, heritage brokers, and activists who, in response to and as a rejection of the international regime of "experts," are now fashioning themselves as what one may call "para-experts," engaged in an explicit and self-aware counter-form of knowledge production. Although I am mostly interested in the development and deployment of this parallel expertise (as opposed to the content itself), it remains a challenge to adequately present this knowledge production as scholarship and not just as ethnographic artifact. This is due in great part to what John Willis identifies as the incommensurable position of Yemeni academics in terms of their institutional and financial support and the different intellectual and political project in which they are engaged. Until recently, Socotran scholars were eager to promote a narrative of Socotran unity, stability, and exceptionalism. This has started to change, however, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which have opened a space for more critical histories to be told.

Finally, as someone teaching at a US institution of higher education in the Gulf, I should say something about intellectual exchange and the proliferation of Western branch campuses mentioned by Al-Rasheed, Hanieh, and Vora. Madawi Al-Rasheed expresses concern that Western academic institutions (not just in the Gulf, but also in the West) may be forced through their funding sources to engage in self-censorship, if not the kind of outright censorship that occurred when Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen was denied entry into the United Arab Emirates for a conference sponsored by the London School of Economics this past March. Adam Hanieh questions whether these institutions will reproduce dominant narratives about the Middle East and both Hanieh and Neha Vora raise the specter of their financial motives. It is undeniable that there are restrictions on academic freedom in these places—as there are in the United States and in Western Europe, especially when it comes to untenured faculty. Here at NYUAD we are guaranteed academic freedom in the classroom and within the institution more broadly, as long as we do not criticize the ruling families or Islam. Critics of these institutions perceive this as a profound infringement upon academic freedom and knowledge production. On the other hand, my students—Emirati, Filipino, American, and Palestinian—are reading and discussing Yasser Elsheshtawy, Andrew Gardner, Ahmed Kanna, and Neha Vora on structural violence, labor regimes, citizen-foreigner relations, and the politics of race, class, and space in the Gulf. In history classes, such as the ones taught by Pascal Ménoret, students are reading Madawi Al-Rasheed, Mamoun Fandy, Stephen Hertog, Toby Jones, Amelie Le Renard, Timothy Mitchell, and Robert Vitalis on resource extraction, corporate capitalism, imperialism, authoritarianism, political protest, and gender in the Arabian Peninsula. If our collective efforts to "theorize the Arabian Peninsula" take root, it will be in universities like NYUAD where students are eager to engage these analyses. This is only one way, but an important one, of creating a new generation of critical scholars and also of developing spaces of inquiry in which "local" scholarship is given serious attention within "Western" universities.

(5) Some argue that the Arab Uprisings changed the ways in which the Middle East can and will be studied. What has been the immediate impact of the Arab uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula and what are likely to be the long-term effects?

The immediate impact of the uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula has been an increased attention to both the transnational reverberations of these events and their antecedents—the politics of sectarianism in and across Arabian Peninsula states, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the peninsula, the impact of social media transnationally, etc. Another result seems to be a renewed attention to various modes of sovereignty—state, popular, cultural—and its contestations. What may and hopefully will emerge with this, then, is the more thorough replacement of the Orientalist notion of "Gulf" states and societies as monolitihic and monochrome sites with a "thicker" understanding of the richness and complexities that underpins each Arabian Peninsula state individually and in relation to one another. To paraphrase Sheila Carapico, it should now become increasingly obvious that the entire Arabian Peninsula "is good for ethnography"—or, more importantly, that it deserves and requires a broader group of scholars’ critical attention.

 


Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula
electronic roundtable contributions:

Thinking Globally About Arabia by Toby C. Jones.

Knowledge in the Time of Oil by Madawi Al-Rasheed.

Capital and Labor in Gulf States: Bringing the Region Back In by Adam Hanieh.

Unpacking Knowledge Production and Consumption by Neha Vora.

Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia by Nathalie Peutz. 

Writing Histories of the Arabian Peninsula or How to Narrate the Past of a (Non)Place by John Willis.

Towards a Critical Cartography of the Political in the Arabian Peninsula by Ahmed Kanna.