Beyond The Voice of Battle

[4 December 2012, protesters spray graffiti on an abandoned Central Security Forces (CSF) truck: \"Revolution Rules\". Image originally posted to Flicker by Hossam el-Hamalawy] [4 December 2012, protesters spray graffiti on an abandoned Central Security Forces (CSF) truck: \"Revolution Rules\". Image originally posted to Flicker by Hossam el-Hamalawy]

Beyond The Voice of Battle

By : Jack Shenker

No matter how many times you witness it, the transformation is still a dizzying one. Kiosks that once vended chocolate and cigarettes, deployed as a gunman’s shield. Shop window shutters framing sugar-sopped cakes or risqué clothes mannequins, now the roughage of a street barricade and clouded in teargas. Rooftops normally barnacled with satellite dishes and humming AC units, today specked with sniper rifle sights. All that familiar stuff, wrenched from an old reality and pressed into use as something different. Two and a half years in, the urban shift from mundane to martial remains as abnormal as ever.

What is happening in Egypt at the moment, and what is being lost? Lives, above all else; hundreds of them—on the streets of Cairo mainly, but also beyond the capital in towns and villages beyond the gaze of the global media. It feels remarkable to have to say this when the sentiment is so obvious, but in the bitter atmosphere of recrimination and accusation that seemingly pervades all Egypt debate at present, it must be said nonetheless: The biggest tragedy of recent weeks is the death of so many, and the maiming of so many more.

Once again, Egyptians are scrawling their names on their arms in a simple effort to avoid being reduced to a number in a morgue, or worse still consigned to the ranks of the uncounted. Amid footage of besieged mosquesrobocop machine-gun fire, and the dreadful, desperate sight of people throwing themselves off bridges to escape a maze of bullets, it is that little detail—the writing on the arms—that always chills me the most. Like efforts by volunteers to collect and catalogue the belongings of the dead, some of whom risked their lives to retrieve plastic bags stuffed with scraps of non-life as army bulldozers closed in, writing a name on an arm feels like the most basic affirmation of presence in the face of a state committed to inflicting absence by the bucket load: Absence of heartbeats, absence of humanity, absence of anything but a narrative in which everything is black and white and people are units to be slotted into pre-drawn political templates. Writing a name on an arm says, devastatingly, "No—I was here too."

But beyond people, something else is being lost, too—just as those most invested in the old Egypt intended. For me, the most powerful expression of Egypt’s revolution has never been anything tangible, but rather that state of mind when the world seems to tip on its head and bevel with possibility, where the landscape of imagination is recast. I first encountered it on 25 January 2011, as I marched alongside a group of anti-Mubarak protesters down the Corniche in central Cairo, and felt a heart-pounding distortion of the air as a line of armed Central Security Forces fanned across the road with their shields up, blocking the path ahead.

Prior to that day, I had attended countless demonstrations consisting of a few dozen Egyptians shunted to some inconspicuous corner of the street, a tight bristle of political energy marooned in an ocean of black-clad troops. The deployment of the police across the road in front of us was a signal that the next section of this script was due to commence; we would come a stop, engage in some minor scuffling, and then be herded into a harmless protest pen so that the capital could get on with its day. But on this occasion, with reports of mass unrest spreading throughout the city, something was different. Nobody among the marchers slowed, nobody broke ranks, and instead they just kept on going, right towards those shields, chanting and glaring mutinously into the eyes of those that held them—each of whom glanced uneasily around at one another and wondered nervously how to respond. In the end, the troops simply gave way. And as we pushed past them and onto the empty street behind, several protesters broke into a run—or more accurately a skip, a dance, a hodgepodge of hops and jumps—and many began whooping and hollering and even kissing the ground.

Doubtless, more important things were happening elsewhere at that moment, beyond that little carpet of liberated asphalt. Certainly episodes of much greater drama would unfold afterwards, both later that evening, as security forces broke the occupation of Tahrir Square with volleys of tear gas, and three days on, when over a hundred police stations were burnt to a cinder and Egypt’s people finally forced Mubarak’s security forces to flee into the night. But for me, that single moment in time—when those around me spontaneously decided to break through the police line and rewrite a mothballed script from the bottom up, that nanosecond where the globe spun, a street was reclaimed and everything in the old universe seemed to stagger, pitch and tumble forward into infinite opportunity— that was revolution, distilled to its purest form. It felt like a tiresome step dance had just gone freestyle as the performers rethought their collective horizons, and careened wildly into a space they had always been told was not for them. It felt like nothing could be the same again.

That newfound sense of agency, of an ability to shape the world around you in ways you never knew existed—that gave me my definition of revolution: Not a time bound event, nor a shuffle of rules and faces up top, but rather a buckling of physical and mental borders from below. Nothing can pose a greater threat to elites wishing to preserve their political and economic privileges than that sense of agency, and since Egypt’s revolution began, not a single farm, factory, classroom, or college in the land has remained entirely immune from its influence.

Which brings us to the scenes on Egypt’s streets today. The relentless imposition of state violence creates binaries as well as bodies: You are either with us or against us, pro-military or pro-Brotherhood, an Egyptian or a terrorist. And binaries from above achieve the opposite of imagination from below. When everything is an either/or, and the contours of change are set from on high, it becomes that much harder to even dream of creating your own alternatives, because every line of independent thought is subjugated by a more fundamental dichotomy: On whose side do you stand? Judith Butler, the feminist philosopher who has faced opprobrium for her condemnation of the Israeli occupation, has spoken of how her critics seek to destroy the conditions of audibility and force a reality in which one cannot speak out against injustice, a reality in which such words of dissent cannot even be heard. How Egypt’s defenders of the status quo, forced onto the back foot by a revolution that struggles against authoritarianism and state violence, have longed to similarly destroy the conditions of audibility. In their current "war on terror," as the strapline on state television puts it, they finally have the enemy, the fight and the stage on which to do so. Thus far, their efforts are meeting with spectacular success.

Of course, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has played its part too in perpetuating false binaries; from the beginning these leaders have viewed the revolution as a rolling opportunity for a private power-grab, never allowing that it could be a process of change for all Egyptians, never permitting the possibility that their exclusionary, often sectarian discourse could provoke a backlash. At its highest echelons, this is the movement that tried to silence those chanting against military rule in November 2011, and then, once democratically elected, used its time in power to harness the Mubarakist security apparatus to its own ends rather than destroying it. The movement that hammered through the most partisan, divisive constitution imaginable for a post-Mubarak nation, and then arrested and tortured those activists daring to take to speak out against the retrograde, toxic path being trodden by Egypt’s new political elite.

Yes, former President Mohamed Morsi won power fairly through the ballot box, but democracy does not end in the polling booth. In an ongoing revolutionary moment, after watching the Brotherhood roll out the red carpet to every element of the old state whose foundations had been so dramatically shaken by popular unrest—from the army generals to the country’s corrupt neoliberal tycoons—Egyptians in the millions took to the streets once again and withdrew their consent to be governed. Emboldened and protected by Morsi’s multiple concessions to them, the security forces saw their chance to turn the tables not just on the Brotherhood, but on the very notion of there being any alternative to elite politics, any alternative to the omnipotence of brutal state power. And so a new narrative—of patriotic soldiers versus jihadi terrorists—took shape, and so much has withered in its wake.

In this arena of guns and certainties, the revolution’s other fault lines fade to darkness. With the conditions of audibility destroyed, we can no longer hear the voices of residents of Ramlet Bulaq—a poor settlement without running water in the shadow of corporate behemoth Nile City Towers. Here, residents, who are denied access to the infrastructure riches all around them, are resisting forced eviction aimed at clearing the way for further high-end construction—part of an elite urban development strategy pursued by the old regime, continued by the Brotherhood, and defended too by the junta that reigns today.

We can no longer hear the chants of collective hope floating up from Qursaya, an island in the Nile likewise earmarked for luxury property-building, where the local farmers and fishermen have twice fought off deadly invasions by the Armed Forces—once under Mubarak and once under Morsi.

We can no longer hear the inspiring discussions of workers at a ceramics plant on the Suez Canal who, tired of their terrible working conditions and all the broken promises of management, besieged their politically-connected boss in his car before my own eyes and began talking excitedly about what it would be like to run the factory themselves.

We can no longer hear the proclamations of villages like Tahsin, in the Nile Delta governorate of Daqhalia, which has declared independence in protest at the rural poverty and marginalization entrenched by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and the Brotherhood alike, the village where a farmer told me last year: “We are no longer hoping that things will get better while we sleep; now we make our hopes real in the daytime.”

Nearly all of the individuals in these communities had joined the protests against Mubarak, voted optimistically for Morsi, and then joined the massive mobilization against him a year later when they saw their revolution being hijacked and betrayed. Their struggles—often dismissively labeled as "parochial" or "sectorial" protests by Egyptian elites—and the feeling of ground-level empowerment and agency which enabled them, are the revolution. And in a binary Egypt whose existential future depends on an all-powerful security apparatus being strong enough to defeat a relentless wave of terrorists, no one can hear them roar.

In such a bifurcated soundscape, it seems absurdly idealistic to believe that any note of revolutionary dissent might break through. But before 2011, when Mubarak was still the darling of the West and former Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali—asked at a dinner party whether he was worried Egyptians might revolt against a new tax law that concentrated even more wealth in the hands of the most privileged—could reply with a chuckle, “Do not worry. This is Egypt ...  We have taught the Egyptians to accept anything,” it seemed absurdly idealistic to believe that a revolution might erupt at all; a few months later, Egypt changed the world. In February 2011 when Mubarak, in response to unprecedented protests, was removed by the generals and the latter were riding a wave of patriotic populism, it seemed absurdly idealistic to believe that a movement opposing the incarceration of civilians by the military and calling for an end to junta rule would amount to anything; by November, a new uprising had shaken the Armed Forces to its core.

Egyptians, as the past two and a half years have shown, are giddyingly liable to take to the streets and provoke a crisis in whatever elite settlement is being foisted upon them. Right now, amid an almost fascistic excess of hyper-jingoism, the prospects seem dim for a revolutionary struggle against authoritarianism, one which rejects false binaries and articulates the slogans of the currently tiny Third Square movement—"No Mubarak, no Morsi, no SCAF" (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces). But absurd idealism, not just in Egypt, but in cities across the globe that have been at least partly inspired by Egypt’s turmoil—from Rio to Athens to Istanbul—has astounded us all in recent years. Those hoping that the conditions of audibility have been broken forever should not rest easy in their beds. 

In reading some of the moving, melancholic words written by Egyptian friends in the past few days as they reflect on what is happening to their country and mourn the murder of so many, one common theme struck me: The pain of feeling like something ineffable was being robbed from within them. Activist Moataz Attalla once spoke beautifully of Tahrir enabling people to taste a different language, to taste possibility; I think that is what Yasmin el-Rifae is referring to when she writes of how the revolution dislodged her cynicism—and how the current “flaunting of our cruelty as a source of pride” has summoned it back. Likewise, Omar Robert Hamilton recalls how transformative it was, that “belief we all shared, for a moment, in each other.”  He goes on: “In an eternity of disappointment and greed and malice that moment, that moment in which being human was finally worth something, in which having a community was preferable to being alone with a book, had a value that will never be lost.”

They are right to acknowledge how much has been shattered and stolen by this bloodshed, and right as well to believe that this is not the end: Whatever has been robbed can be taken back. For now, those fighting for a better Egypt in Ramlet Bulaq, in Qursaya, in Suez and in a thousand other communities across the country may have been quieted, but they will not remain silent forever. And when they do speak out, they will find that this regime has nothing but bullets and binaries with which to answer them. That will not be enough, and so the revolution will continue. As the Sheikh of Tahsin told me, “I will not live as a third-rate citizen anymore. I have withdrawn my acceptance of the status quo. This is the fruit of 25 January, and there is no turning back.”

[This article originally appeared on Mada Masr.]

  • ALSO BY THIS AUTHOR

    • The Egyptians: A Radical History of Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution - Afterword

      The Egyptians: A Radical History of Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution - Afterword

      In late February 2016, President Sisi strode up to the podium at Cairo’s El Galaa theatre, looked into the waiting television cameras, and addressed the nation. “Don`t listen to anyone but me,” he declared. “I am dead serious. Be careful, no one should abuse my patience and good manners to bring down the state. I swear by god that anyone who comes near it, I will remove him from the face of the Earth. I am telling you this as the whole of Egypt is listening. What do you think you`re doing? Who are you?”[i]

Occupy Gezi as Politics of the Body

Since the Gezi resistance started with bloodshed on 31 May, it has had an “anti-depressant” effect, as a friend of mine puts it, as much as it has been nerve-racking. During this period where each day has been prone to new crises and normalcy was completely disrupted, we simultaneously experienced the peaks of ecstasy and the depths of sorrow.

Analyzing such an intense event naturally requires taking some distance. Pending systematization, however, the vivid memory of each day impels one to put on paper multifarious ideas that resonate well with the resistance. Each morning, many bodies with sleep deprived eyes wake up in Istanbul, Ankara, Antakya, Urfa, and Denizli to take to the streets once again, after having quickly checked the latest news in the social media. They are astonished and impressed that they can still walk, run, stand up, and carry provisions for those in the parks. Exhausted bodies rejuvenate with every new threat that the government utters, and with thousands, tens of thousands of others they begin flowing to Taksim, Kızılay, Kuğulu Park, Gündoğdu, Abbasoğlu, and Yeniköy Park carrying home-made gas masks, swimmer goggles, anti-acid solutions, and whistles.

No one does or can govern these bodies. The masses that gather in public spaces are not formed by virtue of transferring tax money into the wallets of partisans. No one provides shuttle buses for them; no one gives them flags, or feeds them with sandwiches. No one assigns them the slogans they shout out during the demonstrations. Bodies that take heart from knowing that they are not alone do not count, or count on, numbers to meet with others in communal or virtual spaces. One standing man suffices for thousands of others to take to the streets. After all, “one” is also a number…

The government, whose tactlessness prompts these resisting and standing bodies to convene again and again every single day, could not have missed the significance of this body politics. These bodies naturally do have a language, even a few languages that are at times congruent and at others incongruent; however, as a whole, they constitute a politics of the body. The rage and dreams that have been embodied in tweets and graffiti since 31 May turn into material realities through the physical existence, visibility, and endurance of the bodies. If history is being rewritten, then its subject is the body.

Four of these bodies lost their lives during this war that the government has waged on society. Thousands of bodies have been beaten up: some lost their eyes, some received irretrievable injuries. Skins were burnt under the water from the cannons, “laced” with chemicals for maximum harm; lungs were choked with tear gas. Pounded arms, legs, and heads got crushed and broken. The long-term effects of the tons of chemicals dumped on bodies are still unknown. What is known, however, is that these chemicals killed hundreds of cats, dogs, and birds, and that they did harm to countless insects, butterflies, and other smaller organisms.

The apparatuses of the state, and the vehicles of death that responded to Gezi’s politics of the body, attempted to imitate the life force that they failed to extort. In response to the huge numbers that filled the parks and squares and astonished everyone without exception, they hoped to gather partisans together in scripted rallies. They began comparing head counts; they calculated representative percentages. When the calculations did not match, they increased the number of police in body armor and helmets and moved them from protest to protest. They built walls of flesh and steel against the wave of resisting flesh. When that did not work, they offered these bodies—which have been in contact with each other physically and virtually through meetings, banners, and tweets—a mise en scène of dialogue, the conditions of which were more or less already determined. They could not even wait for this attempt to yield fruit; two warnings and a command were enough to launch an assault to remove the bodies that produced an alternative sociability from the park, from the space in which physical resistance could be transformed into a life style. They freed the public space of the public. They collected all the banners, pictures, and colors one by one to erase them from social memory. They stripped all the trees, each dedicated to victims of state violence; they appropriated the barricades that were named after tens of people who had undergone physical and psychological torture, and they tore them to tatters. They destroyed the efforts to keep alive the memories of Fikret Encü, who was a victim of Roboski; Metin Göktepe, who was tortured and killed in detention; Dicle Koğacoğlu, who could not take all the sorrow inherent in this society any more; and the Surp Hagop Armenian Cemetery, which was destroyed by Turkish racism.

The only thing that remains is a politics of the body—but the bodies that produce this politics differ from what Giorgio Agamben calls “bare life.” They are not “mere” bodies that the arbitrary will of a sovereign can isolate from society, oppress unceremoniously, or push to the margins of the symbolic world. Rather, they evoke what Ernst Bloch calls “the upright man,” the collective Prometheus. Bloch writes:

Nothing is more fortifying than the call to begin from the beginning. It is youthful as long as it is; to it there belongs a young and aspiring class. It is innocent of the bad things that have happened, for it has never had a real opportunity to be guilty. When this happens, justice has the effect of a morning; it opposes itself to that eternal sickness which was handed down before it. Beginning anew is freshness through and through; it is a first if it appears completely ahistorical, and if it seems to lead back to the beginning of history….It carries the image of the pastoral mood, of the shepherd, of the simple and upright man; one can play with it even in the dark.[1]

Gezi is the struggle of disorderly bodies, those who do not have any dispositif other than their own bodies, against the death machines. If the machines are regulatory instances that follow commands and extort public spaces of mobility with force and violence, then the force they face is the resistance of life itself. Life flourishes at the most unexpected moments and places, just like weeds that crack the concrete and spring out of it. No apparatus of the state can succeed in dominating life absolutely.

The state seeks order; it can control only those whom it orders. It cannot cope with the demand of "freedom"; it has to ask questions such as “freedom for whom,” “freedom for what,” or “freedom under what circumstances” in order to tuck freedom into neat boxes. Order draws borders, fixes identities, and defines. It attempts to establish a hierarchy. By telling parents to take their daughters and sons home from the park, it both brands the resisting bodies as "children" and tries to trigger into action the nucleus of society: family. Through its rhetoric of security, it attributes the risks of its own making to the resisting bodies. It hangs its own flag or banner on the bodies that it prefers knocking down rather than protecting. It punishes those who do not obey; it uses punishment as retaliation. It operates through censorship, threats, and propaganda.

Life, on the other hand, is a constant flux. It challenges borders and moves beyond them. It opens up to circulation those spaces that are closed off due to construction; it paints such destructive vehicles as bulldozers pink; it transforms steps into tribunes, pieces of iron into wish trees, and trees destined to be cut down into monuments. It walks on highways and bridges that are closed to pedestrians. It does not like the empty and the sterile; it covers them up with banners, slogans, tents. It leaves its mark on every surface. It disrupts silence at times with pots and pans, and at other times with a tune from a piano. It plays with identities and definitions; it makes them fluid; it renders them indistinguishable. It can make fun of both itself and the established order thanks to its humor. By changing one single letter in a word, it can ridicule the heaviest of symbolisms. When the state apparatus sends a riot-intervention vehicle to pour tear gas on it, life stops to catch its breath for a while and goes right back to resisting. When a body grows tired, it gets replaced by a reinvigorated one. Life turns into thousands of fingers that tweet and take photographs when the state apparatus sends down vehicles of propaganda. It stops its wheelchair to grab the flag that fell on the ground while escaping from tear gas. It apologizes when it steps on someone`s foot while running; it calms down those who panic.

It is obvious that these bodies that fascism wants to militarize will not assume any ideological identity. When they do not drink alcohol, they ridicule conservatism; when they lie under a TOMA, they make fun of liberalism, which claims that life is the most valuable good. Orthodox Marxism cannot decide under which class struggle these "çapulcu" bodies are to be subsumed. As long as they stay in physical contact, as long as they remain as collective Prometheuses, as long as they—have to—continue the resistance, they grow accustomed to each other`s colors, languages, and genders. They disrupt the behavioral rules that ideologies and institutions expect from them. The natural or moral instinct of protection that has been attributed to mothers loses ground when female bodies participate in the resistance alongside their children. The nationalist and the Kurd exchange anti-acid solutions in gas-filled hotel lobbies. The upper-class college kid drinks the water handed over by the kid with an Anonymous mask without needing to ask what neighborhood he’s from. Soccer fans save their curses for the police rather than for their rivals.

What comes out of all this is trust, not chaos. That`s why the bodies multiply with every gush of tear gas, spaces expand with every police attack, and the quality of contact among the bodies increases with every propaganda speech. The life woven together by bodies born in Gezi is so tenacious that the government is right in fearing it. The power of these bodies stems from their capacity to mutualize endurance, rather than vulnerability (as Judith Butler envisioned they would). One would need to look into the extensive interstices of this politics of the body, rather than into macro-level discourses, to begin deciphering it.

NOTES

[1] Ernst Bloch, Natural Right and Human Dignity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 61.

[An earlier version of this article was published on 26 June 2013 on BIA ("Independent Communication Network"). The link to that version can be found here. This article was translated from Turkish by Gülfer Göze.]