Reimagining the Belle Epoque: Remembering Nation-Building in an Algiers Neighborhood

[Empty beaches, public access and villas without walls. Club des Pins, early-1970s. Image from Société Nationale d`Edition et de Diffusion (SNED).] [Empty beaches, public access and villas without walls. Club des Pins, early-1970s. Image from Société Nationale d`Edition et de Diffusion (SNED).]

Reimagining the Belle Epoque: Remembering Nation-Building in an Algiers Neighborhood

By : Ed McAllister

[This is one of six pieces in Jadaliyya`s electronic roundtable on the anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. Moderated by Muriam Haleh Davis, it features contributions from Ed McAllister, James McDougall, Malika Rahal, Natalya Vince, Samuel Everett, and Thomas Serres.]

Algiers, summer of 1972. A decade after independence and the newspapers are teeming. Algeria has recently been the first country in the region to successfully nationalize its oil and gas reserves; citizens enjoy free universal education for the first time; production begins at the gigantic new steel complex at El Hadjar; work is completed on the first of the 1000 villages socialistes near Tlemcen, agricultural laborers gain ownership of land under the Révolution Agraire; construction work is underway on the luxurious Hotel Aurassi, as well as Oscar Niemeyer’s Olympic Stadium and the Bab Ezzouar university campus in Algiers; worker self-management programs begin in state-owned companies; the first families move into the thousands of apartments that make up the new social housing complex in Badjarah; thousands of ideologically-motivated youngsters from around the world arrive to participate in Algeria’s future. In the capital, the bilingual residents of the cosmopolitan metropolis steer the latest Peugeot 504s down spotlessly clean streets lined with elegant bright white buildings toward the public beach resorts at Club des Pins and Moretti; women wearing white loosely draped ayeks or mini-skirts plan weekends in Paris with no need for visas; long-haired young men in flares drink beer or Pastis at pavement cafés; in the evening, people queue outside the Koutobia nightclub, from which echo the beats of the latest funk and soul hits.

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[Boulevard Abderrahmane Taleb, Bab el Oued, early 1970s. Image from Société Nationale d`Edition et de Diffusion (SNED).]

Fifty years after independence, these events and scenes seem not only to belong to another time, but to another world. How do people today remember the post-independence period and what do these memories tell us about the present? Wishing to move beyond the colonial period and the War of Independence, this article is based on ethnographic fieldwork over a one-year period in the working-class Algiers neighborhood of Bab el Oued. It looks at the ways in which contemporary subjectivities are articulated through references to the nation-building period of the 1970s under President Houari Boumediene.    

What comes across most strongly in these representations of the period is the sense of past-present disjuncture, or of a temporal dislocation. There is a palpable sense that the present is not as it should be and that something important has retreated into the past. However, the relationship with the past in general – and with the 1970s more specifically – is ambivalent. This ambivalence is illustrated by the phrase asra, which stands for both nostalgia and its opposite at the same time, variously denoting a wistful expression that things were better in the past, or an expression of relief that something negative in the past has had its day. Despite widespread nostalgia for the seventies, most of the people I met in Bab el Oued are happy to be rid of Boumediene’s authoritarian brand of socialist-inspired nation-building. The figure of Boumediene is divisive – he is simultaneously hated as a harsh dictator and respected for his integrity and sincere efforts to improve the lot of the average Algerian. Often both of these views belong to the same person. Boumediene was cast alternately in a positive light, as a strong leader delivering a combination of social justice and relative prosperity, stability and discipline), and spoken about negatively (as a merciless dictator that had political opponents eliminated, falsified the history of the liberation struggle, mismanaged state resources and repressed civil liberties). The legacy of authoritarianism was plain to see – most of the older people I interviewed told me before recording began that they felt uncomfortable talking about politics.

For middle-class residents tasting the benefits of material wealth in an economy that is certainly working for some, the Socialist planned economy is deemed responsible for creating a work-shy population that depended on the state and still expects everything to be handed to it on a plate. This is very much the capitalist narrative of entrepreneurial spirit. On the other hand, for working-class residents of the neighborhood struggling to make ends meet, the Boumediene era is remembered as being a time of full-employment and rising standards of living. One narrative claimed that despite the one-party state and lack of institutions that existed for much of the 1970s, Boumedienism’s focus on social justice – ensuring price controls, universal healthcare and social housing – made it more truly democratic than the current multi-party system, despite much greater freedom of expression in the present. For many people I talked to, the trappings of democracy mean little without social justice. One friend drew a clear distinction, couching today’s political system as a periodic redistribution of power among the elite in which the people have no say [therefore authoritarian] and 1970s authoritarianism as providing for people’s basic social needs [therefore more “truly democratic”]: “Before we had social justice but no democracy, now we have neither!” he said. This reversal goes to the heart of a debate about what democracy means to Algerians and reproduces the socialist-humanist propaganda of the 1970s, according to which democracy should be measured in schools, hospitals and land ownership – i.e. in social well-being, rather than in the number of parties in parliament.

Generational divisions also play a strong role in representations of the past. For older people who lived through the 1970s there is a strong sense of both the loss of the country’s early vitality and their own youth. The past is irretrievable and totally irreconcilable with a present in which they seem to struggle to locate themselves. On the other hand, many young people sit somewhere between traditional respect for elders, resentment that their parents’ generation grew up during what is perceived as Algeria’s heyday, and anger at the older generation who are held responsible for the country’s decline since the 1980s. As one graffiti in Bab el Oued defiantly declares, “Pourquoi nous? Cent pour cent skāra felli fessdou lebled” (Why us? 100 percent contempt for those who wrecked the country).

If the politics of the past is divisive, much less ambivalence is displayed when remembering the urban space and sociability of Bab el Oued in the 1970s. This is where representations seem unanimously nostalgic and where the feeling of past-present disjuncture is clearest. There is an overwhelming emphasis on aspects of the past that highlight that which is perceived as being lacking in the present, which is invariably cast in a negative light. Past-present disjuncture is read through the social, political, and economic changes that have occurred during the intervening periods – the economic liberalization and crisis of the 1980s, the violence of the 1990s, and the reinforced state power and consumerism of the 2000s.

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[The Great Mosque and park – now replaced by a multi-storey car park – early 1970s. Image from Société Nationale d`Edition et de Diffusion (SNED).

Descriptions of the 1970s depict spaciousness, a lack of traffic jams and crowds; there is clean, well-maintained urban infrastructure, and a sense that society was up-to-date with the latest fashions, cinema and music. I was told many times about the trucks that would nightly wash the streets with seawater, the uniforms worn by the city’s taxi drivers and the fines imposed on those spoiling the aesthetics of apartment buildings by hanging washing to dry on balconies. These images contrast with today’s overcrowded, congested, and dilapidated neighborhood whose cinemas and bars have closed and which offers virtually no spaces in which young people can express themselves. Nearby public resorts such as Club des Pins have long since become gated communities accessible only to the elite. Discussion of the past often includes condemnation of Bab el Oued’s degraded infrastructure in the present, especially the state of pavements and roads, the amount of uncollected rubbish in the streets and the dilapidated state of most apartment buildings. The seventies stands for seriousness in the management of public affairs – from urban infrastructure to lack of corruption – by a state that had not yet retreated from its responsibilities. The sense of temporal dislocation also goes hand in hand with an apparent spatial dislocation: while many older residents frequently complained about no longer recognizing their own neighborhood, many younger people struggled to recognize images of Bab el Oued’s streets taken during the seventies.

The sociability of the 1970s is seen as standing for a set of values that are currently in decline. The social relations of the time are viewed as being characterized by respect for tradition and the authority of elders, couched in terms of terbiya (politeness and good manners) and orma (respect for social boundaries, particularly between men and women). The sociability of the seventies is depicted as being cohesive, with warm and cordial relations between neighbors. People knew each other and could trust one another. This is contrasted with the situation today, where mistrust of other people is often seen as being the norm and where state management of urban infrastructure seems to have been abandoned. This state of affairs is frequently couched as “āg ‘la man āg” (everyman for himself).

Memories of the 1970s are refracted through depictions of the appearance of serious economic crisis during the mid-1980s and the resulting increase in social disparities and decline in living conditions, and particularly through the social fragmentation brought by the violence of the 1990s. During the conflict, Bab el Oued experienced large-scale immigration from surrounding rural areas as people fled to the relative safety of the capital. Many of Bab el Oued’s residents saw their chance to escape and sold their apartments to newcomers, which means that people are now less likely to know their neighbors. In addition, the appearance of armed groups, bomb attacks, assassinations and the grim reality of having to get to work or school not knowing if one was to return alive, meant that people spent more time indoors.

While much media and academic attention has been given to the issue of who was doing the killing in Algeria, for residents of Bab el Oued the social production of mistrust between citizens compounded the total breakdown of state-society relations was compounded at the local level. People doubted not only who was who, but also who was informing on whom. Apartments were secured by steel doors and metal bars, and the days when children would move freely between apartments to visit their friends, and neighbors would stop to chat in the street, seemed well and truly over. Furthermore, the emergence of a consumer society and the measurement of success in terms of new cars and flat screen TVs in the more stable environment of the 2000s have further reduced social cohesion, as people increasingly act as individual consumers. Indeed a common criticism of the 1970s relates to the persistent shortages of consumer goods, as the planned economy found itself unable to keep up with increased demand fuelled by exponential population growth. Young people today simply cannot imagine going to the market and only being able to find green peppers and watermelons, or only being able to buy clothes made by SONITEX, the national textile company, especially since massive hypermarkets and malls have recently begun to appear on the outskirts of the city. Many older people seek to dignify what must have been far from ideal circumstances, with a fond smile and a sense of “we did not have much, but we were happy.” 

In contrast to their parent’s recollections of a dignified past, to the young people that form the majority of Bab el Oued’s population the present seems to be anything but dignified. It offers only the meager prospect of endless daily struggles and humiliations - the struggle to combat boredom and stay out of trouble; to deal with an overcrowded city in which tempers can fray easily; to create a future for oneself despite nightmarish bureaucracy and an education system that does its best under difficult circumstances; to find some private space in which to stay positive and make the best of things.

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[The swimming pools at Kettani, Bab el Oued, early-1970s. Image from Image from Société Nationale d`Edition et de Diffusion (SNED).]

In this sense, nostalgic remembering is a way of commiserating over the trials of life, cultivating intimacy through shared expression that allows people to define themselves in the world. Rather than a wish to turn back the clock, it allows people to express discontent with the way things have turned out, and to suggest that life should – and could – be better. Memories of the seventies depict the period as a time before globalization when Algerians were still firmly rooted in their own traditions, but were also embracing an exciting new modernism with confidence. In the social imagination of Bab el Oued, the decade represents a balance between tradition and modernity, precisely the areas in which the ideologies par excellence of the 1980s and 1990s – neo-liberalism and Islamism – accused it of failing. More importantly, these memories provide a sharp reminder that the challenges of Algerian independence – to build a democratic, social state that is at once modern and respectful of tradition – are still very much there for the taking.

[Click here to read the introduction or read other contributions].

 
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Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula Roundtable: Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia

[This is one of seven contributions in Jadaliyya`s electronic roundtable on the symbolic and material practices of knowledge production on the Arabian Peninsula. Moderated by Rosie Bsheer and John Warner, it features Toby Jones, Madawi Al-Rasheed, Adam Hanieh, Neha Vora, Nathalie Peutz, John Willis, and Ahmed Kanna.]

(1) Historically, what have the dominant analytical approaches to the study of the Arabian Peninsula been? How have the difficulties of carrying out research in the Arabian Peninsula shaped the ways in which knowledge is produced for the particular country/ies in which you have worked, and in the field more generally?

When I first began studying Arabic and, subsequently, formulating a research project in Yemen in the early 2000s, I did not consider myself to be working in or on the "Arabian Peninsula," as such. Rather, what drew me to Yemen was its historical, geographical, and cultural distinctiveness, which remains even now quite remarkable, but which nevertheless often obscures the relations, connections, and shared histories and presents that do exist within the region and beyond. This oversight is born perhaps out of what Sheila Carapico identified nearly ten years ago as a pernicious "dualism" that shaped not only American research agendas, but also the stereotypical conceptions, popular and academic, of "the Gulf" (rather than the peninsula as a whole): "Yemen is kaleidoscopic; the Gulf is monochrome…The Gulf is good for business; Yemen is good for ethnography" (Carapico 2004).

This same oversight—what Adam Hanieh in his response discusses as a "methodological nationalism"—is also born out of what we may call a secondary Orientalism: a way of "knowing" that considers the majority of the Arabian Peninsula without "culture" and without "history" in comparison to the Arab states of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. This fallacy has been exacerbated, of course, by the relative difficulty for short-term visitors and new scholars of actually engaging on a deeper level with the citizenry in countries like the United Arab Emirates, where it may be easier to befriend migrants from Egypt or Sri Lanka than its small minority of "nationals." As a result, although there have been notable exceptions—including recent scholarship on the political economy, political ecology, and youth and urban cultures in Saudi Arabia, in addition to an older, rich tradition of studies on kinship and its Bedouin—anthropological scholarship on Gulf-state citizens has seemed relatively flat in comparison to the "thicker" ethnographies of migrant populations in "the Gulf" and of "tribal" communities in Yemen. In both cases, these research foci emerge from the historically dominant approaches to these "two" areas: oil and security in the Gulf (and its resulting dependence on cheap, imported labor) and state-tribe relations in Yemen (and related studies on tribalism, sociality and gender). Nevertheless, they are also being productively complicated by theoretically informed analyses of space, political subjectivities, and belonging. A similar and amplified turn to non-labor migrant populations in the Gulf (as in the work of Mandana Limbert in Oman) and non-tribal populations in Yemen (such as Marina de Regt’s work on Ethiopian domestic workers or Susanne Dahlgren on the public sphere in Aden) remains welcome.

As for the difficulties in carrying out, rather than framing, research in the Arabian Peninsula, the challenges of conducting research in Yemen may be somewhat distinct. Adam Hanieh, Ahmed Kanna, Madawi Al-Rasheed and Neha Vora have touched on the lack of (Western) research institutes and networks in the Gulf, the dearth of statistical data, and the difficulty of gaining unmediated access. In Yemen, a robust network of foreign research institutes work in tandem with several Yemeni research and studies centers to house and fund scholars and to facilitate their research there. These include the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS), the French Center in Sana’a for Archaeology and Social Sciences (CEFAS), and the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). In the early 2000s, when I lived in Sanaa, these centers supported a vibrant research community of both foreign and Yemeni scholars who frequented their libraries and attended their talks. The deteriorating security situation in Yemen and the subsequent evaporation of US funding for in-country research has had an unfortunate impact on these centers, which, during my visits in recent years, have appeared particularly vacant. Still, even with this institutional support, it could be challenging to be an anthropologist in Yemen. For one, as Ahmed Kanna notes, anthropology is one of the less known and less understood of the social science disciplines. And when my Yemeni acquaintances did have an understanding of anthropology, they were also well aware and suspicious of its colonial and imperial legacy. This was made clear to me when a professor of anthropology at Sanaa University asked me in March 2003 in front of his class of students why the United States had not sent one hundred anthropologists to Iraq, instead of bombing it. Suspicion toward the discipline and a more general suspicion of foreign researchers as spies was not new. One only needs to read Steve Caton’s remarkable account of his arrest and imprisonment in 1980 to see what an effect such suspicions have had on the kind of knowledge that is produced. Indeed, in reflecting on his own encounter with the National Security in Raydah, Paul Dresch notes that it is often the most mundane of facts that are the most heavily guarded.

This was certainly true of my own experience of fieldwork in Socotra. Whereas I was made privy to various conspiracy theories, extra-marital affairs, secret religious conversions, etc.—all things I hesitated to take note of, much less write about—it was nearly impossible for me to ask my hosts quite straightforward questions about their genealogies, tribal structures, and political past. Of course, I was conducting research at a time when US presence in Iraq as well as in Yemen was acutely palpable. Moreover, it made little sense to my Socotran friends that a US student would receive funding to hang out in Socotra or anywhere else if she did not have significant ties to the political powers that be. As a result, I turned to and became more interested in Socotri poetry where people’s opinions, struggles, and contestations were more forcefully voiced. In so doing, I thus followed, or rather stumbled, in the footsteps of a group of scholars who work on poetry in Yemen, including Steve Caton, Flagg Miller, Lucine Taminian and Samuel Liebhaber, but without their expertise! Fortunately, such suspicions do ease over time. Although it has become even more difficult in the past five years for anthropologists to conduct fieldwork in Yemen, now that I live in Abu Dhabi where I am easily accessible by telephone and where my current position is more comprehensible to my Socotran interlocutors, Socotrans are more comfortable reaching out to me, calling upon me for help, and working with me. I know that if I were to have the chance to return again for a lengthy period of time, fieldwork—in terms of the questions I could ask and the answers I would receive—would be very different this time.

(2) What are some of the new and innovative ways of thinking and theorizing the Arabian Peninsula and how has your work drawn on these approaches? How do these new theoretical interventions address elisions or tensions within more traditional approaches?

In my view, one of the most useful attempts to reframe and theorize the Arabian Peninsula occurred with the 2004 publication of Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (edited by Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis). It is here that Sheila Carapico issued her "Arabia Incognita: An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies" cited above. Carapico’s is a research agenda that would bridge the conventional divide between Yemeni and Gulf Studies to focus on the interconnections between the inhabitants and nations of the peninsula as a whole. Whether in direct response to Carapico’s invitation or in reaction to the region’s most recent and emblematic transnational phenomena, such as the global “war on terror,” the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the spread of the Arab uprisings, several scholars and even academic journals have now taken up this call. For example, in the past two years we have seen the 2011 launch of the Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea followed by, in 2013, the conversion and expansion of the journal Chroniques yéménites into Arabian Humanities: International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula, both focused on the Arabian Peninsula en bloc and from antiquity to present.

What is needed when it comes to theorizing the Arabian Peninsula, however, is not just an expansion of scope—a sort of micro "area studies"—but also scholarship that explicitly draws on and forwards this transnational and interdisciplinary peninsular perspective. This approach breaks with the traditional dualism described above in its recognition that one cannot adequately study migration, religious reformism, sectarian identities, state and popular (or cultural) sovereignty, youth cultures, urbanism, natural resource exploitation and conservation, gender transformations, heritage production, or class, etc., within one nation without at least recognizing the influences and entanglements of these phenomena throughout the peninsula and across its surrounding waters. New scholarship that exemplifies this approach includes, of course, Engseng Ho’s work on Hadhrami migration; Adam Hanieh’s work on transregional (Khaleeji) capital and class formation; Laurent Bonnefoy’s work on Salafism in Yemen (and yet highly contingent upon grassroots flows to and from Saudi Arabia); Steve Caton’s emerging research on water scarcity in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Andrew Gardner’s comparative studies of the kafala system in Bahrain and Qatar, among others.

Even in a relatively "remote" and off-shore location such as Socotra, this "peninsular" perspective is imperative to an understanding of the "local" and of how Socotra has been produced recently as a World Heritage Site and a "natural" biodiverse research laboratory. Yet, in the early stages of my research on the development, conservation, and heritagization of Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago, and perhaps due to the pervasiveness of the distinctions drawn between Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, I was surprised by the degree to which my Socotran friends and neighbors were oriented not toward Sanaa or Aden, but rather toward Salalah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Sharjah, Bani Yas, and Jeddah. It was the cities and representations of "the Gulf" and Saudi Arabia—not mainland Yemen—which captured their imaginations and fueled their aspirations. Indeed, I soon learned that I could not examine heritage production in Socotra—conventionally understood to be a "national" project—without first examining heritage projects and discourses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. For example, the annual Festival of the Socotran Poet which, as I wrote about in MERIP last May, was transformed in 2012 into a platform for public debate on the viability of Socotra’s cultural and political sovereignty, was originally modeled after the United Arab Emirates’ reality television show, The Million’s Poet, created by the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (now the Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority) to promote and safeguard national Emirati culture. This small example demonstrates to me the importance of seeing and understanding the peninsula holistically instead of continuing to bifurcate it into Yemen and the rest.

This is not to say, however, that the space and study of the Arabian Peninsula is any more "natural" than are the constructed borders of its nation-states. I agree with Toby Jones and John Willis’ deep reservations about area studies and about the "Arabian Peninsula" as yet another imperially produced category. As well as they state it here, these reservations are, of course, not new. And yet, as all of the contributors to this roundtable point out or imply, the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf—Yemen, too (hence Lisa Wedeen’s book title, Peripheral Visions)—have long been treated as peripheral, geographically and conceptually, to the Middle East and to Middle East studies. One only needs to look through the bibliography of Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar’s excellent review article, "Anthropologies of Arab-Majority Societies," to note that ethnographies and anthropological articles situated in Egypt or in Palestine far outnumber the recent scholarship produced on all of the Arabian Peninsula states combined. There is thus obviously no a priori reason to theorize the "Arabian Peninsula"—but we may still learn a lot in doing so.

Here, at New York University in Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), Pascal Ménoret, Justin Stearns, and I were hired into a nascent program named "Arab Crossroads Studies." During our first year teaching at NYUAD, we spent many hours debating both the merits and productivity of the name and the rationale for turning this then-concentration into a full-fledged undergraduate major. The legacy of US area studies’ Cold War roots was something we took seriously. What does "Arab Crossroads" even mean? And was it productive or just as flawed to move from a geographic focus, that is, Middle East studies, to a linguistic, cultural, and ethnic one: the Arab world? Even as these are questions we continue to ask, the renaming and reframing does something. If nothing else, it reminds me as a scholar and a teacher to focus more explicitly on the historical, political, economic, and social connections between the "Arab world" and its immediate surroundings (Africa, South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Europe) as well as on the human, material, and conceptual "crossroads" within "it." In doing so, it draws our attention away from place and toward movement across space and within various spaces.

In treating the Arabian Peninsula as a "center" rather than a periphery, we are forced to widen our geographical focus and broaden our conceptual one. That is, we cannot design classes or research projects as if the "Arab world" or the "Middle East" begins in Morocco and ends in Muscat. Nor can we ignore the capital and labor flows that link South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant (and also to the United States). Finally, as Tom Looser has convincingly argued, it is with the export of Western universities and branch campuses to the Gulf and East Asia, for example, that area studies gains new salience. With the fashionable emphasis today on all things "global," a critical area studies approach can ground and situate an otherwise imperialist (and predominantly Western) sense of "global" knowledge and "cosmopolitan" belonging. Through the newly established "Arab Crossroads Studies" major at NYUAD, we seek to emphasize to our "global" students that their being here, in Abu Dhabi—in the Arabian Peninsula—does matter and that Abu Dhabi is not merely the "global" city it aspires to be, but that it, too, has been historically and politically produced. Included, however, among the required courses for all undergraduate majors is a "Problems and Methods in Arab Crossroads Studies" course: a course that examines area, area studies, and areas like the "Arabian Peninsula" critically, while asking what new theoretical interventions such a focus may uncover. We welcome further discussion on this!

(3) "Sectarianism" seems to have reemerged in popular and academic work on the Arabian Peninsula as both the label for and analytic of a socio-political phenomenon. What is the utility of both past and more recent formulations of "sectarianism" as an analytical tool for the study of the Arabian Peninsula? What challenges or problems have these formulations created?

This is an important question.  As I have not worked on sectarianism directly, however, I will defer here to the other roundtable participants.

(4) What is the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics in the United States, Western Europe, Russia, etc.? What kind of attention has been given to local and regional knowledge production, if any?

I think it fair to say that the relationship between local scholarship produced in the Arabian Peninsula and the work done by academics from the outside is growing stronger, while still remaining contingent upon or even hampered by the hegemonic status of English as the scholarly lingua franca. We see this even in the shift from French- and German-language publications to English-language ones. Serious scholarship produced by "Western" academics does rely on local scholarship and knowledge production, but more can and should be done to translate these works to make them more widely accessible. For example, I recently assigned Ahmed Kanna’s Dubai: The City as Corporation to my students at NYUAD. Kanna draws heavily and productively on the writings of Emirati scholar Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah, thereby introducing his important work to Kanna’s English-language readership. As the majority of Abdullah’s articles have been published in Arabic, however, I am less able to assign them directly, meaning that "local" scholarship, like his, may be in danger of being presented or perceived as secondary to the English-language publications that build upon it.

Similarly, in my work on Socotra, I draw considerably on the texts written and published by the Socotran historian Ahmed al-Anbali (who resides in the United Arab Emirates), as well as on knowledge production by non-academics. The latter include Socotran guides, heritage brokers, and activists who, in response to and as a rejection of the international regime of "experts," are now fashioning themselves as what one may call "para-experts," engaged in an explicit and self-aware counter-form of knowledge production. Although I am mostly interested in the development and deployment of this parallel expertise (as opposed to the content itself), it remains a challenge to adequately present this knowledge production as scholarship and not just as ethnographic artifact. This is due in great part to what John Willis identifies as the incommensurable position of Yemeni academics in terms of their institutional and financial support and the different intellectual and political project in which they are engaged. Until recently, Socotran scholars were eager to promote a narrative of Socotran unity, stability, and exceptionalism. This has started to change, however, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which have opened a space for more critical histories to be told.

Finally, as someone teaching at a US institution of higher education in the Gulf, I should say something about intellectual exchange and the proliferation of Western branch campuses mentioned by Al-Rasheed, Hanieh, and Vora. Madawi Al-Rasheed expresses concern that Western academic institutions (not just in the Gulf, but also in the West) may be forced through their funding sources to engage in self-censorship, if not the kind of outright censorship that occurred when Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen was denied entry into the United Arab Emirates for a conference sponsored by the London School of Economics this past March. Adam Hanieh questions whether these institutions will reproduce dominant narratives about the Middle East and both Hanieh and Neha Vora raise the specter of their financial motives. It is undeniable that there are restrictions on academic freedom in these places—as there are in the United States and in Western Europe, especially when it comes to untenured faculty. Here at NYUAD we are guaranteed academic freedom in the classroom and within the institution more broadly, as long as we do not criticize the ruling families or Islam. Critics of these institutions perceive this as a profound infringement upon academic freedom and knowledge production. On the other hand, my students—Emirati, Filipino, American, and Palestinian—are reading and discussing Yasser Elsheshtawy, Andrew Gardner, Ahmed Kanna, and Neha Vora on structural violence, labor regimes, citizen-foreigner relations, and the politics of race, class, and space in the Gulf. In history classes, such as the ones taught by Pascal Ménoret, students are reading Madawi Al-Rasheed, Mamoun Fandy, Stephen Hertog, Toby Jones, Amelie Le Renard, Timothy Mitchell, and Robert Vitalis on resource extraction, corporate capitalism, imperialism, authoritarianism, political protest, and gender in the Arabian Peninsula. If our collective efforts to "theorize the Arabian Peninsula" take root, it will be in universities like NYUAD where students are eager to engage these analyses. This is only one way, but an important one, of creating a new generation of critical scholars and also of developing spaces of inquiry in which "local" scholarship is given serious attention within "Western" universities.

(5) Some argue that the Arab Uprisings changed the ways in which the Middle East can and will be studied. What has been the immediate impact of the Arab uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula and what are likely to be the long-term effects?

The immediate impact of the uprisings on scholarship on the Arabian Peninsula has been an increased attention to both the transnational reverberations of these events and their antecedents—the politics of sectarianism in and across Arabian Peninsula states, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the peninsula, the impact of social media transnationally, etc. Another result seems to be a renewed attention to various modes of sovereignty—state, popular, cultural—and its contestations. What may and hopefully will emerge with this, then, is the more thorough replacement of the Orientalist notion of "Gulf" states and societies as monolitihic and monochrome sites with a "thicker" understanding of the richness and complexities that underpins each Arabian Peninsula state individually and in relation to one another. To paraphrase Sheila Carapico, it should now become increasingly obvious that the entire Arabian Peninsula "is good for ethnography"—or, more importantly, that it deserves and requires a broader group of scholars’ critical attention.

 


Theorizing the Arabian Peninsula
electronic roundtable contributions:

Thinking Globally About Arabia by Toby C. Jones.

Knowledge in the Time of Oil by Madawi Al-Rasheed.

Capital and Labor in Gulf States: Bringing the Region Back In by Adam Hanieh.

Unpacking Knowledge Production and Consumption by Neha Vora.

Perspectives from the Margins of Arabia by Nathalie Peutz. 

Writing Histories of the Arabian Peninsula or How to Narrate the Past of a (Non)Place by John Willis.

Towards a Critical Cartography of the Political in the Arabian Peninsula by Ahmed Kanna.