Turkey Media Roundup (October 21)

[Refugees from Kobane at the Turkish border. Image via Shutterstock.] [Refugees from Kobane at the Turkish border. Image via Shutterstock.]

Turkey Media Roundup (October 21)

By : Turkey Page Media Roundup Editors

[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Turkey and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Turkey Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week`s roundup to turkey@jadaliyya.com by Sunday night of every week.]

English

Kobane, ISIS, and Protests in Turkey

Petition: Officially Arm the People`s Protection Unit (YPG) of Syria to Defend ISIS from Destroying the Kobane Community A petition on the official US government website calling for the armament of YPG forces by the US.

Turkey to Train Syrian Rebels, But at What Cost? Fehim Taştekin argues that by training forces for the war against ISIS, Turkey will experience a “Pakistanization.”

Turkey Decides to Hit Kurdish Rebels Instead of ISIS Piotr Zalewski’s report on airstrikes targeted at PKK forces by the Turkish government.

Unmasking Turkey`s ISIL Strategy James Denselow purports that attempts at involving Turkey in saving Kobane requires a thorough understanding of its international politics and strategy.

Syrian War Changes Turkish Border Towns Tülin Daloğlu reports from towns near the Syrian border, talking to locals about ISIS recruitment in the area, Kobane, and Syrian refugees.

Kobane and Turkey’s Energy Ambitions Barçın Yinanç discusses the relation between Turkey’s stance toward Kobane and its economic policy regarding energy investments.

How to Defeat Islamic State`s War Machine Metin Turcan lists the factors that contribute to the military efficiency of ISIS, and a possible way to combat it.

Turkey Opens First Case against Oil Smuggling with Syria Tulin Daloğlu reports about the first oil smuggling case with Syria, hinting at the lack of state control on the border.

Setting US and Turkish Priorities Straight According to Mustafa Aydın, the US and Turkey have different priorities on Iraq and Syria, and therefore differences regarding their attitude toward ISIS.

Erdoğan Twangs Populist Chords Again Semih İdiz criticizes Erdoğan’s remarks about the US-led coalition against ISIS as “less than diplomatic” and populist.

Does PM Davutoğlu Remember What He Told al-Assad in 2011? İsmet Berkan points out the contradictory attitude regarding both public dissent and the justice system in Turkey.

Turkey`s Passive-Aggressive Inaction in Kobani is Anti-Kurd, Anti-Peace Politics. And It`s Dangerous Mutlu Cıvıroğlu scrutinizes Turkey’s reluctant attitude towards Kobane.

ISIL, Kurds, and Turkey’s "New Deal" According to Nuray Mert, Turkey’s domestic and international politics should be read in the light of the “broader regional ambitions” of the rulers rather than the realities.

Why Does the US Want the Bases? Abdulkadir Selvi details Turkey’s priorities regarding Syria and Iraq, and points to the discrepancies between the expectations of the US and Turkey, which has recently surfaced during official talks between the two governments.

A Secure Zone Beril Dedeoğlu discusses the potential implications of a security zone proposed by the Turkish government.

There Is No Scenario Where Turkey Comes Out a Winner Lale Kemal finds the Turkish government’s role in the fight against ISIS concerning.

The War Nerd: Nobody Could Have Predicted Islamic State’s Retreat from Kobane (Except Me) In a speculative blog piece, Gary Brecher discusses the reasons why Kobane did not fall.

The Results of the Kobane War; So Far... Amed Dicle looks at the military dimensions and international response to the ISIS siege in Kobane within the context of Turkey`s ambivalent response to the violence.

Asya Abdullah: Kobane Corridor Is Essential In an interview, the co-president of the PYD, Asya Abdullah, addresses some misconceptions about the on-the-ground situation in Kobane, calling for the opening of a corridor.

Saleh Moslem: Turkey Has Not Kept Its Promise In an interview, PYD co-chair Saleh Moslem describes the situation in Kobane and claims that Turkey’s complacency is aiding and abetting ISIS.

Erdoğan Furious with the US, Adds al-Assad Condition Dissatisfied with the communication between the US government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), President Erdoğan has added another condition for Turkey’s participation in the fight against ISIS: addressing the Assad regime, which he sees as the source of the problem.

Who Benefited Most from the Rise of ISIS? Mahmut Övür argues that Turkey has suffered most from the rise of ISIS, speculating that it is another attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the government.

Security Bill

Draft Security Bill Could Give Turkish Police Sweeping Powers The AKP proposed a new law after forty-three people died in clashes following a series of nationwide demonstrations sparked by the unfolding situation in Kobane.

Pent-up Pressure in Turkey Abdullah Bozkurt points out that the bill submitted by the AKP that will give emergency powers to police and government-designed tribunals is in fact a witch-hunt targeting any opposition asking for social justice and a corruption-free and accountable government.

Democracy for Sale Emre Uslu explains the AKP’s bill, which envisages drastic changes in the Turkish Penal Code and the Code on Criminal Procedure entails.

A Conversation with the Deputy Prime Minister Verda Özer’s interview with Yalçın Akdoğan regarding Kobane, anti-protest security measures, and the peace process.

The Government Is Preparing for a Huge Witch Hunt According to Orhan Kemal Cengiz, the new legislation is a planned as an attack against the Gülen movement, aiming to damage the movement on economic grounds by allowing the seizure of private property at any stage of a judicial process.

New Law to Permit Turkish Police to Detain "Possible" Protesters The Turkish government plans to a pass a regulation that strongly limits the right to protest, even before protesting happens.

The "Kurdish Question" and the Peace and Reconciliation Process

Continuing on the Path Without Falling into the Trap (1)-(2) Markar Esayan argues that for the peace process to continue, the government should increase the opportunities for communication between Öcalan and Kandil and the HDP.

Government and Kurds Raise the Stakes in Peace Game Özgür Korkmaz argues that after the PKK’s call for “serhildan” (rebellion in Kurdish), and Erdoğan’s equating the PKK with ISIS, the stakes are now higher in the peace process.  

As West Dances with Kurds, Conditions Shift According to Orhan Miroğlu, the presence of ISIS in Kurdistan is changing the entire global view on the Kurdish question and creating a legitimate arena for the Kurdish movement.

Kobane, Kurds, and Peace According to Ibrahim Kalin, claims that Turkey is attacking Kurds rather than ISIS are misleading.

Foreign Policy: UN Vote

Turkey, EU Adopting a New Language Serkan Demirtas analyzes the discursive shift in Turkey’s relationship with the EU since the formation of the new government under Ahmet Davutoğlu.

In Third Round of Voting, Turkey Loses UNSC Seat to Spain After lobbying for a temporary seat on the Security Council, Turkey, a heavy favorite, lost to Spain.

Why Did Turkey Lose in the UN Vote? Murat Yetkin argues that, among other things, the main reason why Turkey lost the vote for the seat on the UN Security Council was its contentious involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, and other Islamic groups.

Turkish Foreign Policy in Fall Ünal Çeviköz examines Turkey’s loss of the UN Security Council seat in light of the recent quagmires of Turkish foreign policy, both in the West and in the Islamic world.

Turkey`s Perception Gap According to Joost Lagendijk, the failure of Turkey’s defeat at the Security Council indicates a more fundamental “erosion of Turkey`s international standing” rooted in the polarization of Turkish politics and its frictious geopolitical stances.

UN Vote Shows the Intentions of Our Adversaries İlnur Çevik asserts that the vote at the UN is a larger effort to undermine Turkey’s credibility in the global community based on faulty information about Turkey’s approach to Kobane and the Kurds.

Was It Really a Surprise? Yusuf Kanlı claims that, given the restrictions on journalists and press freedom in Turkey, it is unsurprising for members of the UN to choose a different candidate for the Security Council.

What Do the UNSC Elections Mean? Analyzing the various reasons for Turkey’s loss of the UN Security Council seat, Kılıç Buğra Kanat claims that this loss ultimately benefits Turkish foreign policy, which he sees as having taken the moral high ground on contentious global issues like the conflict in Syria.

Economy

As US Economy Recovers, Turkey Falters Mehmet Çetingüleç shows how the rise of the value of the US dollar poses a threat to the economies of countries like Turkey.

The Army of the Unemployed Threatens Erdoğan Given the rise in unemployment and the stagnation of the economy, Emre Deliveli argues that the government’s reputation is beginning to tarnish among the people of Turkey.

The Effect of ISIL on Economic Balances Erdal Sağlam claims that ISIL is an obstacle for Turkey’s foreign economy and that the Kobane protests create a social fragility that threatens the national economy as well.

Unemployment Continues to Rise Seyfettin Gürsel sees Turkey’s stagnant growth and rising unemployment as an ominous obstacle for the AKP’s electoral goals for next year.

Global Slowdown, Turkey`s Divergence and the G20 According to Sadık Ünay, Turkey’s ascension as a global economy and its forthcoming presidency of the G20 in 2015 offer the Turkish government some positive economic options to preclude further stagnation.

Falling Oil Prices: Turkey and a New War on Sharing Cemil Ertem purports that the transformation of the global economic order has given Turkey a leg up in the western-dominated oil economy over other regional powers like Iran and Russia.

Sizzling or Cold Turkey? Emre Deliveli compares recent economic figures out of Turkey and the United States and asserts that any anomalies in the statistics are merely “normalization pains” in the continued economic growth of Turkey.

Other Pertinent Pieces

Turkish Image Abroad Slumps Pınar Tremblay argues that the Turkish government`s public diplomacy attempts continuously fail at improving the country’s public image in the international arena.

Turkey`s First "Gay Marriage" Semih İdiz tells the story of Turkey’s first unofficial gay marriage and the resultant reactions, which implicate the conditions that LGBTQ individuals experience in Turkey.

Turkish

Kobane and ISIS

Gezi-Kobanê kıyası olur mu? İrfan Aktan argues that Gezi and Kobane are incomparable, since Gezi was a riot grounded on constitutional rights, whereas Kobane is a resistance against an invasive armed group.

Türkiye halkının Kobanê’yi savunması için on sebep Emrah Altındış lists ten reasons for the Turkish nation to support and defend Kobane.

Kobanê’nin gözyaşları Relaying his observations from Kobane, Ferhat Tunç argues that the AKP has formulated its “New Turkey” through the barbarity of ISIS.

Soma ve Kobane’yi birlikte düşünmek Thinking the Soma mine massacre and Kobane together, Cihan Tuğal argues, “All in all, the producers of ‘cheap commodities’ who poison our rivers, destroy our history, kill our workers, have finally used ISIS to pull one over on us.”

Hükümet ve Kobanê tavrı Celalettin Can criticizes President Erdoğan’s equating the PKK/PYD with ISIS.

Kimse üç maymunu oynamasın: Türkiye göz göre göre hem içte hem dışta savaşa giriyor Arzu Yilmaz warns that Turkey is entering a war, both inside and outside its borders.

Kobani direnişi, barbarlığa karşı bir mücadele (1)-(2) Mete Çubukçu argues that the Kobane resistance is a struggle against barbarism.

Yeni Türkiye`nin Ortaçağ şiddetiyle imtihanı Nilgun Tunccan Ongan points out that the AKP does not attack ISIS, but rather attacks Kurds who are escaped from ISIS’ violence and students/protestors/fighters/doctors who went to the border to show solidarity with Kobane.

IŞİD ile PKK aynı şey mi? Criticizing the AKP’s equating the PKK with ISIS, Mehmet Altan argues that the AKP is an unprincipled and inconsistent government.

Kobane ruleti, patavatsiz Biden, kuskun Pire In an interview, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KYB) politburo member Sadi Ahmet Pire criticizes Turkey’s role in the international coalition against ISIS.

Kürtler Kobani`de kaybederse Türkler kazanmış mı sayılacak? (1)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(5) Rusen Cakir analyzes the relation between the AKP’s approach to Kobane, ISIS, and the Kurdish question.

Türkiye’nin Suriye’de eli hep uzundu Seda Altuğ argues that Turkey has been intervening in Syria’s politics since the 1920s.

Kobane Protests in Turkey / Declaration of State of Siege and Curfew

Kobane direnişi ile dayanışma kapsamında yapılan eylem ve etkinliklere müdahale sonucu meydana gelen hak ihlalleri raporu According to the Human Rights Association (IHD)’s report about the rights violations that took place during protests in solidarity with Kobane, forty-six people were killed between 2-12 October 2014.

Bir devlet alışkanlığı: provokasyon Çetin Yılmaz historicizes the state’s provocation attempts against non-Turkish and non-Sunni minorities, which crystallized again during street protests for Kobane.

Türkiye iç savaşa mı gidiyor? Cengiz Çandar argues that the AKP’s new “security law” in the wake of protests in solidarity with Kobane, as well its silent support for ISIS, is leading Turkey into a civil war.

Diyarbakır’da ‘fabrika ayarları’na, yani karanlığa dönüş Frederike Geerdink criticizes the government’s declaration of curfew in Diyarbakır as a response to protests in solidarity with Kobane.

Cezası hafif, bedeli ağır: Sokağa çıkma yasağı, diktatoryal bir yetkidir Criticizing the declaration of curfew, Ali Topuz argues that the government is killing its citizens.

Irkçının ve arsızın kutsal ‘bankamatik’ hakkı… “As a citizen, I am sick of your anxieties about `bus’ metal, sidewalk’s stone, ATM’s button.` It makes me nauseous that what you understand by ‘public’ is only its ‘property,’ not its ‘life,’” writes Murat Sevinc.

Memleketin fabrika ayarlarına dönüş Analyzing the media coverage of Kurds in the wake of Kobane, Emrah Göker argues that Turkey is turning back to the 1990’s “war on terror” rhetoric.

`Türkiye böylesine aciz ve yeteneksiz bir siyasi kadroyu iş başında görmedi` Cengiz Candar argues that the declaration of a state of siege and curfew are signals of the government’s loss of its ability to govern the country.

Kobane, the "Kurdish Question," and the Peace and Reconciliation Process

Çözüm sürecine dair bilmek istediğiniz her şey Umut Ozkirimli explains why Kobane affects the reconciliation and peace process in Turkey.

Sokaklar neden mi karışıyor? Bizi aptal yerine mi koyuyorsunuz? Umut Ozkirimli argues that what spurs violence and unrest in Turkey is the government’s suspension of the peace process, as well its continuing oppression of Kurds.

Kürtlerin isyanı, iktidar, HDP: Asıl mesele barış sürecindeki binbir çelişki Nuray Mert points out that Kobane has crystallized the contradictions in the peace and reconciliation process.

Çözüm yol haritasından değil demokrasiden geçiyor According to Murat Aksoy, the AKP wants a reconciliation grounded on patriarchy and religion-brotherhood, not on democratic rights, equality, and constitutional citizenship.

‘Kürt sokağı’ndaki gerçekler karartmayla değişmez! Hasan Cemal argues that the AKP is increasingly relying on a language of war, the rhetoric of a "war on terror," and police force.

Kobanê, Kürt sorununun kendisidir According to Bese Hozat, the AKP’s approach to Kobane is in fact a reflection of its approach to the Kurdish question.

Security Bill

Ne mutlu polisim diyene: Artık ‘akla’ değil ‘kafaları’na göre arama yapabilecekler! Ali Topuz unpacks what the new regulation will bring (for example, the incorporation of “reasonable doubt” into policing), and marks it as a significant authoritarian turn.

Farkında mısınız? Cengiz Çandar argues that by equating the PKK with ISIS and perceiving the issue as a national security concern, the president and the prime minister put the future of the country in jeopardy.

AK Parti’nin hedefi siyaseti sokağa itmek According to Murat Aksoy, by passing the new regulation, the AKP aims to push politics to the streets, delegitimizing political concerns and consolidating its power

Demokrasi ve Avrupa Birliği hedeflerinden çark etme reformu! Hasan Cemal presents the bill as a serious diversion from democracy.

Katalog suçlar genişletiliyor, telefon dinlemelerinde geriye takip yasallaşıyor Füsun Sarp Nebil details the content of the security bill and discusses its real-life implications.

Hukukçular yeni yargı paketini yorumladı: Bunları İsrail Filistinliler`e uyguluyor According to legal experts, the AKP uses its law-making power for its self-interest, and attempts to implement a de facto martial law in the country.

Polis Partisi! Ferdan Ergut demonstrates how discourses of “public order” and “preventive policing” are strategically used to strengthen authority by the police, and how the new regulation also serves the government’s current objective of controlling public dissent.

Other Pertinent Pieces

`Başörtülü kadın yazar`ın 12 yaşında baş örtme üzerine söyledikleri ve dahi söyleyemedikleridir! Fatma Barbarosoğlu discusses the meaning of the lifting of headscarf ban for minors.

İncirlik "Bilmecesinin" Tarihi Haluk Kalafat gives a summary of the socio-political history of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.

Published on Jadaliyya

Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı’nın Anısına

From Home to Real Estate: Urban Redevelopment on the Axis of Speculation in Istanbul

In Memory of Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı

Evden Emlağa Fikirtepe: Rant ve Spekülasyon Ekseninde Kentsel Dönüşüm

Turkey’s New Migration Policy: Control Through Bureaucratization

Le projet de ville nouvelle Bio-Istanbul: Un urbanisme spéculatif, ségrégatif et durable

The Legacy of Turkish in the Armenian Diaspora

المهجرون السوريون ونظام اللجوء في تركي

Roj Roja Rojava

Liberalizmin tasfiyesi ve Ortadogu`da alacakaranlik

Soma ve Kobane’yi birlikte düşünmek

Gezi Platform NYC Call for Solidarity with Kobane

Turkey after Gezi: An Interview with Simten Cosar

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The Chronicle of Higher Education Interviews Jadaliyya Co-Founder Bassam Haddad

The following interview was conducted by Ursula Lindsey with Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad in preparation for a feature about Jadaliyya for The Chronicle of Higher Education. The feature was published on 29 September 2014 and can be accessed by clicking here.

Ursula Lindsey (UL): Could you send me any statistics on the readership of Jadaliyya? I would like to get a sense of the overall size of the readership, and how it is geographically distributed.

Bassam Haddad (BH): We have become much less interested in numbers after having passed an important threshold in 2013, but we do not totally ignore them! Unfortunately (because one would like to see an alternative), the best indicator of the growth and expansion of readership has been “Facebook Reach,” which increased from around fifty thousand per week during the first six months in 2010–2011, to one million in 2012–2013, and surpassed 2.3 million in 2014. We actually stopped monitoring such numbers as closely, but know that our social media and classroom presence continues to increase steadily as our Facebook followers have surpassed 130,000. These followers are pretty active in circulating our content, and constitute a large part of how Jadaliyya content is disseminated. Twitter is another indicator. However, we refrain from tweeting too much, as shown by our tweets-to-followers ratio—which is perhaps among the highest (9900 tweets and twenty-seven thousand followers), at about thirty percent. The closest we have seen in our field is about forty-five to fifty percent. This reflects the extent to which each post/article, and/or tweet, is generating interest. It is important to note that our Arabic reading audience, world-wide but mainly in the region itself, has quadrupled since 2011, and now constitutes almost thirty to thirty-five percent of our readership, a testimony to how local informed readers elect to turn to Jadaliyya frequently—largely because our writers on local matters are either writing from the region or are intimately connected with the region.

As to other forms of tracing numbers, such as unique visitors, they seem quite inconsistent because the extent to which Jadaliyya is read not only via Android, iPhone, and iPad apps, but also because of the unusually large level of circulation of PDFs via huge email lists (which we are on and we see!) and, most importantly, its ubiquitous presence on syllabi (for instance, our unique visitors to the site hover around 500,000 a month, while most read Jadaliyya off line via email, PDF, or apps). Our Middle East scholars/educators/researchers list, now combined with that of Tadween Publishing, our sister organization, tops eight thousand engaged Jadaliyya readers who are increasingly assigning material from Jadaliyya.

The reason this happens is not only because we have good content. There is plenty good content if one searches the net carefully. Rather, it because of four very specific reasons: first, our good content has a long shelf-life, an outcome that is built into the editorial process; second, Jadaliyya content serves as an explicit resource or reference, through twelve topical and country/region-specific Media Roundups, profiles and archival posts for reference use, as well as weekly pedagogical reviews of new books, films, documentaries, art exhibits, and relevant social media items; third, Jadaliyya, in conjunction with Tadween’s blog, has become the space that most educators/researchers constantly visit for matters related to academic freedom, publishing, and higher education in the region as well as the United States and Europe; finally, our Jadaliyya content is selectively tapped to produce books and pedagogical publications that are published by Tadween Publishing and other publishers like Palgrave and Pluto Press, giving more gravity, and more longevity, to Jadaliyya content. One important source of such readers is JADMAG, of which we have so far produced five issues geared to educators, and chock-full of resources that are compiled and categorized at the end of each issue. (see www.JadMag.org or www.TadweenPublishing.com for more information). 

This source of readership is constantly expanding as Jadaliyya seems to be the only available site for such content (now quadro-lingual), and is our litmus test and what keeps us on our toes from day to day. The reason we emphasize this source in relation to numbers and quality is because the population of students reading Jadaliyya material based on educators’ choices is increasing exponentially at times, and serves as our most consistent source of readership with time especially that newcomers from that sphere become loyal readers. 

It is no surprise that the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) consistently sends us their critical public letters to publish when they want to reach the broader academic and research/journalist communities, including beyond the United States. It is not something you see consistently on any other website. And this applies to various other organizations that would like to reach the same expansive cohort (based in the United States, Europe, or the Middle East), including the new Arab Council for the Social Sciences (ACSS).

Our colleague and professor of Arabic literature at Brown University, Elias Muhanna, who also runs his own popular blog, Qifa Nabki, commented openly at a conference that he does not know a professor teaching the modern Middle East who does not have a variety of Jadaliyya articles on their syllabi—an honor that ranges from rare to unique when it comes to similar online publications. 

UL: We discussed stories that caused particularly strong debates, and you mentioned the critique of DAM`s video. Are there any other pieces that sparked debates?    

BH: Just to clarify, this last piece sparked more than a debate, as some folks where actually unhappy with the approach—though we are still in good communication with the concerned parties (e.g., DAM) given our approach to the matter. The pieces that sparked debate, discussion, and the like are actually many, and I am not sure it would be fair to single out a handful. However, the notable pieces that drew heated debates and attention revolve around the July coup in Egypt, or around the nature of the Syrian uprising. But this is almost a continuous variable, and still sparks heated discussions that reflect the polarization on these matters among concerned publics. Nonetheless, we continue to get serious engagement—even if sometimes a bit over the top—from detractors on various topics, from Palestine and Syria, to articles on sexuality, Islam, and even literature and film. The fact that detractors of the entire publication continue to engage and critique reveals a sense of legitimacy that even this cohort associate with Jadaliyya. For a critical publication, this is priceless, and we think we will fail if we do not maintain that level of quality and legitimacy.

UL: What are the most common criticisms or suggestions for improvement your get? Do you think they are valid? Where do you see room for improvement? When I last saw Jadaliyya Co-Editor Sinan Antoon in Cairo, he said, for example, he thought the site might publish less so as to focus more on the quality of the writing. 

BH: Oh, dear, there are all kinds, and so many of which come from us, the editors, given that various page teams are relatively autonomous. Our position on critique is simple: we ignore any critique at our own peril. This does not mean that all criticisms are equally valid. They are not. It does, however, mean that we take them seriously and assume their validity until we can illustrate otherwise to ourselves and to others. In most instances, critiques do include a modicum of validity, and our responsiveness to nearly every single significant line of critiques (based on a compilation) is the reason we keep growing in quality and numbers. We surely miss some, and we surely make mistakes even in assessing critiques—but these represent a minority of cases within our practice. Based on what we have heard, we see room for improvement in soliciting even more writing from the region; in working harder to get more pieces from the scene, on intractably controversial matters, like Syria; and we agree that we, like any successful publication, can get too comfortable with its status quo of readership and contributors. But questions like yours, and internal discussions based on similar observations, push us on a quarterly basis to make a deliberate and explicit effort to reach out. This is in fact why we dramatically expanded the Arabic section (in terms of readership and contributors) during the past two years. 

All in all we operate on a five-year plan of sorts (despite the problematic association with five-year plans). At this point, as we are still in our fourth year, we are establishing ourselves as a serious and perhaps the go-to publication for informed readership. But you will soon see some changes that will expand our scope and spice things up a bit in a productive direction, at a time when we need not worry as much about the basics and daily operations. Our challenge, actually, is to maintain the essentially voluntary-based nature of Jadaliyya. Therefore, much of what we have focused on during the first years of establishment involves building the best team there is, or what we think is such, under these circumstances. It is a continuing challenge, but it has been working since 1992 when the parent organization, the Arab Studies Journal, started.

As to the question of quantity verses quality, we exercise a mean purge every quarter, precisely to avoid the false impression that quantity is synonymous with quality. Surely, we fail here and there. However, the one development since 2013 has been the reduction of the output rate—which we view as having been somewhat unavoidable as this is how you connect with new readership and contributors in the early stages—from about 175 pieces per month to about 110-120 (though this includes all posts and reports, etc.). But this challenge continues, and—frankly—we hold ourselves to standards that are not observed in comparable publications that either focus on one country, or one approach (e.g., Foreign Policy), or one audience, or one language, or one discipline, etc. So we have to make up our own standards for a new kind of publication. All this takes time, and we welcome any criticism that allows us to meat our challenge. We are not sensitive to productive critique at all! We will fail without it. 

UL: You mention detractors of the site—any examples?

BH: Every new initiative gives rise to critics, and that is a good thing. What is interesting about Jadaliyya’s critics, most of them at least, is that they critique and stick around for the most part—largely because of what they tell us verbatim at times: “We expect more from Jadaliyya,” or something of the sort. Now the question of who these critics are depends on the issue, and often our biggest critics on one topic are our biggest fans on another. Syria is a good example where we get flack from both pro-opposition corners and anti-opposition corners, but you would find avid readers of other Jadaliyya pages among both varieties. Do we have critics that do not think Jadaliyya is worth reading at all? You bet! There is very little we can do to convince those voices otherwise. Having said all of that, the fact is that Jadaliyya has filled a gap and presented a centrifugal force around which critics of mainstream discourse on the region in the United State and beyond hover. That in and of itself has generated detractors. 

UL: It seems to me that Jadaliyya has a pretty clear, consistent identity, both in its politics and its theoretical orientations. The people who edit and write it are generally the same age and peer group, and many have known each other for a long time. Do you think you have a wide enough variety of views? Do you feel like Jadaliyya has been able to spark debates outside of a community of like-minded contributors and readers? 

BH: [One factual note: the editors and contributors are by no means of similar age or belong to similar social circles—not after 2011, regarding the latter comment, and have never been, regarding the former comment. We have had more than a thousand contributors and the Jadaliyya team surpasses eighty people living in different countries now. Any cursory view of any fifty consecutive posts reveals a variety that easily surpasses most comparable publications. As for views, it is a political challenge, not always a question of diversity. See below.]

This is the one-million dollar question. Yes, any good publication must struggle with this dialectic of building a readership based on a particular kind/nature of knowledge production, but then expanding it to attract new readership and contributors while retaining the reason for its success. Are we guilty of not doing this perfectly? Absolutely. Have we gone far beyond most other publications to allow for serious internal differences and reach out to new and alternative views? Absolutely. But that does not exhaust the question. As mentioned above, we are in the building stage, and we view a good part of the shortcomings as related byproducts. However, this is one of our fundamental goals as we enter and complete our fifth year, and it will not come without its risks, risks we are very happy to take. Most importantly in reference to sparking discussion or debates, Jadaliyya articles have been written about and discussed in conferences and in social media in ways that have actually jump-started broader research questions and helped set research agendas—not to mention the impact of Jadaliyya on the carriers of junior writers who make their debut there and then get picked up by other institutions who are hiring, paying, and producing knowledge. The list is pretty long.

Having said that, two comments are relevant here. First, we are not and do not pretend to be an open forum for all views. Though I suspect you recognize that and you are not asking about why we do not highlight and invite problematic (racist, sexist, classist, etc. writers), but rather, from within the perspective we support, we may still afford more variety—and that is totally fair, and the above addresses our need to meet this challenge in increasingly better ways.

The second comment is political, and refers to the context within which Jadaliyya and other publications emerged in recent years. We see ourselves as a counter-discourse in relation to the dominant and quite entrenched discourse on the Middle East in the United States primarily, but also beyond. We also see ourselves in the same manner in relation to the petro-media empire of some Arab states. In this context, we are trying to provide an alternative reference point for sound daily analysis on the region. To establish that difficult reality and standard, we have had to be more focused on consistency and quality, sometimes at the expense of maximum diversity. So, we are not, per se, seeking diversity of “views” in the absolute sense, which is a matter/goal that speaks more to liberal concerns that are often divorced from realities of power and its direct relation to dominant discourses. However, where we have room to improve on this particular point, which is how we understand your question, is to establish even more diversity “within” the “general” perspective we endorse. And, yes, we do have some work to do in that respect, but not always for lack of trying. We are fighting an uphill battle and we also have to pay attention to the challenge of dragging everyone along while expanding this spectrum (i.e., the million-dollar challenge/question above). The years ahead will speak louder than any words regarding our genuine interest in making this happen within the context of a counter-discourse movement.

Also, we do not pay our writers, and this restricts us by excluding many careerist writers who might have provided a diversity of sorts despite differing views.

Finally, it is important to note that beyond the essentials, we have ongoing viewpoint disagreements within Jadaliyya regarding content and particular pieces. We think it is a testament to the absence of a rigid conception regarding which particular views are welcome.

UL: Finally, there is an argument that young academics should focus on scholarly work and publication and not "waste" their ideas and time on writing for web sites and other venues. How do you respond to that? 

BH: We totally agree in principle, considering the kind of online publications and quality that proliferates. And whereas we would give the same advice, we cannot ignore the fact that the strategic position of Jadaliyya within the academic community can be a plus for rising academics who would like to be read and heard. Last year alone, several folks within and outside Jadaliyya remarked to us how valuable their Jadaliyya contributions were in capturing the attention of employers/academics in the hiring process. This semi-exception is borne out of the fact that Jadaliyya has indeed become the go-to place for academics generally, despite what this or that observer can say, sometimes legitimately, about the quality of this or that post. We just have to make sure that this continues to be kept to a minimum in the coming five, or ten, years!

So, in short, it depends. In the case of Jadaliyya, publishing there can be used strategically to enhance one’s chances of getting an academic job. We used to think that this was not the case before we were told otherwise by employers and during academic interviews. Used properly, it can be a plus, and this is not confined to Jadaliyya, as there are a number of quality publications out there. The world is changing, and the academic community is following suit, even if at a few steps behind.

UL: Are you planning on publishing anything soon on Obama`s war on ISIS?

BH: Yes, we have published a number of pieces addressing the rise and nature of ISIS, in both Arabic and English, and, beginning the week of 22 September, our fourth anniversary incidentally, we are publishing a regular media roundup specifically on ISIS-related articles. Stay tuned!