Quick Thoughts: Mouin Rabbani on Aleppo and the Syria Conflict

[Photo of Blown-out tank in Aleppo taken by Voice of America News uploaded from Wikimedia Commons] [Photo of Blown-out tank in Aleppo taken by Voice of America News uploaded from Wikimedia Commons]

Quick Thoughts: Mouin Rabbani on Aleppo and the Syria Conflict

By : Mouin Rabbani

[The ongoing full-scale assault by the Syrian military, Russian air force and allied militias on eastern Aleppo, which forms the most significant remaining opposition stronghold in the country, appears to portend a strategic turning point in the Syrian conflict. Jadaliyya turned to Co-Editor Mouin Rabbani, former head of political affairs for the office of the UN special envoy for Syria, to examine the various ramifications of these developments]

Jadaliyya (J): What are the prospects for the Syrian opposition if it is defeated in Aleppo?

Mouin Rabbani (MR): If the Syrian government successfully retakes eastern Aleppo, which seems increasingly likely, this will represent a strategic defeat of major proportions for the Syrian opposition as a whole and leave it in a very unenviable and many would add untenable position.

One reason the opposition appears to be on the verge of losing Aleppo is that it has effectively been abandoned by Turkey. It has recently also been getting less energetic support from Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, as the latter is increasingly pre-occupied with its Yemeni quagmire and domestic crises.

As the outlook for the Syrian opposition diminishes further post-Aleppo, it is likely to lose additional sources of foreign as well as domestic support and sponsorship. An already divided and fragmented opposition will fragment even further, and I would additionally expect it to become more localized as it switches to low-level insurgency while other elements try to pursue negotiations or some form of accommodation with Damascus. 

Many observers and analysts have also noted that the failure of the mainstream political and armed opposition groups to achieve regime change is likely to further strengthen the position of more extreme groups within what will remain of the insurgency.

(J): Will Syrian President Bashar al-Asad face further challenges if he succeeds in Aleppo?

(MR): I think it likely that however dominant the government emerges from the current conflict it will not succeed in quickly or easily re-establishing the status quo. This is because it is in the nature of such regimes that once they lose full control over their citizenry, it is virtually impossible to regain it. That I think forms the most important challenge over the longer term. Particularly so because the government is incapable of offering the basic services and amenities it provided before 2011, which were in any case already substantially reduced relative to previous decades. Furthermore, the Syrian economy can be expected to become even more dominated by well-connected cronies and similar figures than it was before.

Secondly, I think it is important to note that Damascus and its allies, although comprising a significantly more unified and coherent coalition than the one that is to varying degrees opposing the regime, also has internal differences of its own. The main one is that Russia would like to achieve a political resolution of the conflict, in which the concept of a political transition is replaced with that of an expanded government. In this formulation, elements of the political and armed opposition would be integrated into the regime to enhance its stability and re-legitimize key institutions such as the military. Needless to say, this outcome can only be achieved through a political process and negotiations. Damascus by contrast is opposed to any political process that entails meaningful negotiations and concessions to the opposition, including the limited agenda being promoted by Moscow–others would argue that it opposes any political process as a matter of principle and believes it can turn the clock back to early 2011. If Iran, which thus far appears to broadly share Assad`s stance on the resolution of this conflict, were for any number of potential reasons to come round to Russia`s position, this would represent a serious problem for Damascus.

Third, while the Syrian state has survived intact, it has also fractured and disintegrated to a significant degree. Re-establishing central authority over regime loyalists, including various new power centers such as the warlords and local militias that have emerged during this conflict, is also a challenge. Putting them out of business could pose serious risks.

The above notwithstanding, I suspect it is somewhat premature to begin discussing post-conflict challenges. Although an opposition defeat in Aleppo represents a major and indeed strategic turning point, this horrific bloodbath is unfortunately not yet over.

(J): How do you expect the international community to respond to current developments? 

(MR): This is a difficult question because the situation appears to be in even greater flux than in previous phases of this conflict.

My sense is that, its protestations notwithstanding, Washington has effectively ceded the Syrian file to Moscow. By “Washington” I mean the Obama administration, though I would add that Trump is unlikely to reverse course and would in any case find it difficult to do so.

Turkey also seems to be gradually disengaging from the conflict, on account of the combined costs of Russian hostility and domestic instability represented by the failed 2016 coup and its aftermath.

Egypt by contrast may be getting more involved in Syria, or at least aligning its views more closely with those of Damascus as relations with its Gulf patrons deteriorate and those with Russia, and potentially with Iran, improve.

The Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular, will be very interesting to watch during the next twelve months. They have convinced themselves that their problem with US policy towards Syria is Obama personally and his limited interventionist agenda in particular, and that his departure will signal a resumption of business as usual in the Middle East. Yet his successor has heaped more praise on Damascus than any US president since the Ba’thists seized power in 1963. Will the Gulf states fall into line once they realize the US position is essentially unchanged under Trump, or begin to pursue a more independent agenda? I suspect it will be the former, particularly given that their main gateway to Syria, Turkey, appears to be disengaging.

I presume that Moscow will want some kind of international endorsement of the endgame if and when this is achieved, whether through a UN process or other multilateral forum it can more easily control. But against this, Damascus will probably prefer a situation in which the international community is simply removed from the equation.

More broadly, it is important to recognize that this is not so much a Syrian conflict as it is a conflict in Syria, with all manner of local, regional, transnational and international parties pursuing competing agendas and proxy conflicts on Syrian soil. These parties and agendas are not going to vanish just because the insurgency appears to be absorbing a strategic defeat in Aleppo that may amount to a mortal blow.

But hovering over all these regional and international actors stands Russia, which together with Iran and militias recruited by the latter have been prepared to make the investments and sustain the losses required to promote their objectives. I think it is important to recognize that within Syria, Russia continues to retain escalation dominance.

(J): Would the fall of Aleppo mean that Asad has won the war? Can he win the peace?

(MR): The Russian intervention that began in late 2015 has removed regime change, and for that matter “political transition”, from the agenda for Syria`s foreseeable future. If in addition to this the armed opposition groups lose control of eastern Aleppo, and later perhaps Idlib and areas around Dera’a and near the Jordanian border in the far south as well, that strikes me as a pretty fair description of Asad having won the war or at least this phase of it which formed the greatest threat to his political survival.

Yet this “victory” will have come at such enormous cost in terms of blood, treasure, displacement, sovereignty, communal relations and all the rest of it that – combined with the thoroughly inflexible nature of such regimes when it comes to issues such as political compromise, power-sharing and national reconciliation – it is difficult to envision how Damascus can additionally win the peace.

I would also add to this the enormous if not existential challenges of reconstruction. Syria has experienced infrastructure destruction on an industrial scale, the economy is in ruins, the fabric of Syrian society has been shredded several times over, and the massive displacement, brain drain and capital flight will not be easily reversed with Asad still in power. Nor will significant Arab or international assistance be forthcoming.

This said, I do not expect to see a partition of Syria, particularly now that the Islamic State movement appears to be losing its territorial base, and that Moscow, Damascus and Ankara appear to have reached an informal understanding to prevent Kurdish self-government in northern Syria.

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Quick Thoughts: Thomas Serres on the Algerian Succession

[Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in office since 1999, is widely reported to be in failing health and has not been sighted in public for over two years. His current condition raises questions about the presidential succession in Algeria, as well as broader issues concerning the stability, policies and direction of the Algerian state. Jadaliyya asked Thomas Serres of the University of California, Santa Cruz to place the Algerian succession in broader context]

Jadaliyya (J): Why is Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika still in office?

Thomas Serres (TS): Even though Abdelaziz Bouteflika is clearly in failing health, there are three factors that explain his continued tenure:

First, members of the presidential entourage, that is to say all those whose political, social or economic position depends on the presidency, are unwilling to abandon their privileges. This includes individuals directly related to Bouteflika, such as his brother and counsellor Saïd; powerful businessmen such as Ali Haddad; political figures such as Prime minister Abdelmalek Sellal or Amar Saâdani, who was the head of the National Liberation Front (FLN) until his recent resignation. This entourage is also connected to broader networks of vested interests and clientelism that are deeply embedded within Algerian society.

The second factor is that it is difficult to find an alternative figure who will guarantee the internal equilibrium of the ruling coalition, has a minimum of legitimacy (i.e. whose installation will not overtly insult the popular will), and who can also satisfy Algeria’s international partners by perpetuating the fiction of a gradual, which is to say never-ending, transition toward democracy. 

The third factor is broader. Even if it may sound counter-intuitive, an institutionalized state can function without a functioning head of state. Each of the state’s various institutions and agencies possesses its own goals, its own hierarchy, and its own internal dynamics. This does not mean that the Algerian state is not corrupt, or that the government manages the nation’s wealth for the common good. It just means that to implement coercion, extraction and basic management of the population, the active leadership of Bouteflika himself is not necessary.

(J): What, if any, succession measures have been put in place?

(TS): Succession measures have been put in place during the past few years, and recent developments within the ruling coalition have contributed to the on-going process of re-ordering the power structure.

The main development has been the forced retirement of General-Major Mohamed Médiène and the subsequent dissolution of the regime’s secret service and political police, the Département Renseignement et Sécurité (DRS). The removal of this major power center illustrates the ongoing restructuring inside security apparatus. Following a presidential decree published in January, the DRS was dismantled and its remains placed under the control of the presidency. Athmane Tartag, a former DRS officer, is now in charge of coordinating these services in his role as Minister-Counsellor to the President for Security Affairs. At the same time, the military’s Chief of the Staff, Ahmed Gaïd Salah, has reinforced his control over the army, notably by participating in the removal of Médiène and the dissolution of the DRS, but also by cashiering some high-ranking officers and promoting others in their place.

Another important measure taken to organize the succession has involved a constitutional make-over. In theory, the revised constitution gives parliament more control over the government and imposes term limits on the presidency. Yet, since institutional limitations can easily be overturned by the ruling coalition, this nod to liberal constitutional norms is entirely compatible with the pervasively anti-democratic nature of the Algerian regime. At the same time, this revision confirms that the next president will have to be elected through a “constitutional process,” even if everybody knows that the process will be heavily guided by the administration.

(J): Who are the leading candidates to replace Bouteflika, and what do they represent?

(TS): In case of a health emergency, the head of the Council of the Nation (the upper house of parliament), Abdelkader Bensalah, will be constitutionally in charge of the transition. Given the polemic on his Moroccan origins, it is highly unlikely that Bensalah will be more than an interim figure. If you come back to the idea that the successor will have to be validated through an electoral process, you can divide the candidates into three categories.

First, you have high-ranking bureaucrats who graduated from elite national schools and made their career in the administration before becoming members of the government. This kind of candidate represents the continuity of the internal equilibrium of the regime and the persistent force of the “state class” beyond the end of Algerian state capitalism. Here, one can identify current Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, but also his predecessor Ahmed Ouyahia, who has become the head of the presidential cabinet.

Second, you have figures of authority, individuals with longstanding experience in diplomatic affairs who are well-known in international circles, and can thus benefit from the support of foreign partners. In this context the figure of Lakhdar Brahimi, who is said to have the support of the Americans, has sometimes been mentioned. One could also think of Mourad Medelci, the current head of the constitutional council, who has been in the highest decision-making circles for some time.

And finally, you have former prime ministers who entered into conflict with sections of the ruling coalition and subsequently became opposition figures. Depending on the overall situation, such individuals might represent a good solution in the sense that their ascendancy perpetuates the twin myths of “democratic transition” and “political liberalization.” At the same time, their familiarity with the regime would be counterbalanced by former disagreements conducted within it. Be that as it may, someone like Ali Benflis or Mouloud Hamrouche could present a credible face for the renewal of the civil leadership.

I did not mention Saïd Bouteflika, because he would be a suicidal choice for the regime and an incredible provocation given his highly unpopular image. Those who have ruled the country for so long, and who have worked so hard to secure their positions cannot ignore this kind of risk.

Additionally, no figure of the historical FLN has emerged as a credible candidate. After the resignation of its secretary general, Amar Saâdani, at the end of October 2016, the old nationalist party is once again in crisis. In fact, the FLN has long become a catch-all (but soul-less) clientelist structure. This may be enough to dominate a legislative election, but is insufficient to elevate a candidate as the new face of the ruling coalition.

Finally, the most important point to emphasize here is that the absence of a clear plan for succession illustrates the uncertainty that characterizes Bouteflika`s Algeria – this uncertainty has in fact become a way to manage the polity.

(J): Do you expect that there will be an orderly transition?

(TS): From a regional perspective, the geopolitical stakes are too high to permit any major upheaval to occur in Algeria. At the same time, there will always be some kind of social unrest, given the fact that the political system as a whole lacks legitimacy and that the current economic equilibrium is neither fair nor viable. Nevertheless, memories of the civil war of the 1990s are still very fresh and developments in Libya or Syria act as a foil to any potential uprising. The vast majority of the political oppositions will do anything they can to avoid violence.

In addition, the next Algerian president will surely struggle to reinforce his position, create his own networks of affiliates and reduce the influence of his competitors. This is what happened during Bouteflika`s first mandate, and this is what usually comes with any major change in a country`s leadership. During this period, the political landscape might be unstable, but given the blurriness that characterizes the Algerian political arena, it might also be an opportunity to introduce politically meaningful debates and competition.

In any case, the narrative of impending catastrophe – one that is often present in political analysis on Algeria - must be overcome. While this discourse helps to shape a governance based on security concerns and paternalism, it does not respond to the demands for dignity and justice that motivate popular discontent. Moreover, focusing on power struggles at the summit of the state is a red herring. The main issue is not the individual who will rule the country. Rather, the key issues concern economic reforms that could be implemented under the pressure of pro-business elites and foreign actors, and the risk that a neoliberal turn represents for millions of Algerians.

Given low hydrocarbon prices, the defenders of such a reorientation of the country`s political economy are in a favourable position. At this point, I don`t see how the privatization of public sector businesses and the reduction of subsidies can help the more precarious segments of the population. It is rather the opposite. Whatever we think of the Algerian state, it has remained constrained by the legacy of its “specific socialism.” Yet, the current economic emergency might lead to the (sadly common) hybridization between a security-state and neoliberal restructuring. From this perspective, the identity of the next president is more of an epiphenomenon than a central question.