It was early afternoon at the Congress for the Republic (CPR) headquarters in downtown Tunis, known amongst its members as Hezb el Koujina — literally, the Kitchen Party. Mr. Mohammed Abbou, standing in the CPR headquarter`s actual koujina (kitchen) was hurriedly eating a sandwich before scuffling off to a meeting with the rest of the party`s political bureau. Abbou, currently Tunisia’s Minister of Administrative Reform, was trying his best to swallow bites of his sandwich, while leaving sufficient amounts of time to breathe and answer the questions of those surrounding him: young party members who were asking him about his ministry’s structure and about the course of internal politicking he does with his peers. Enter his wife, Mrs. Samia Abbou, who is also a member of Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly. Next, a hot house of five heated conversations all occur at the same time. Using her remarkably animated, fiery mannerisms Mrs. Abbou jokes with two younger CPR members, interrupted only by a phone call that she answers outside the kitchen. This is the political scene at CPR headquarters, similar to many other party settings in post-Ben Ali Tunisia: approachable and raw.
The former president`s ouster on 14 January 2011 led to an opening of Tunisia`s path to a functional democracy. The ouster has also activated the partisan dreams of many activists-turned-politicians. For decades, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali`s Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD), which emerged in 1988, dominated the political scene. The party penetrated all national administrative levels and every aspect of the Tunisian`s daily life. From public institutions such as municipalities and post offices to private corporations and family-owned shops, you could be certain to catch a glimpse of Ben Ali`s omnipresent stare. Posters and framed pictures of him hung at every doorstep, difficult to miss. "Elections" always heralded seemingly miraculous results; the percentage voting for Ben Ali never dipped below 80 percent. Most political activity was violently crushed during Ben Ali`s era. From 1988 to 1999, the Progressive Democratic Party (Parti Démocrate Progressiste, PDP), then one of the only parties operating legally, was allowed to run in the elections. Yet PDP, which is still active today as an opposition party, was largely seen as background décor, both by ruling RCD party members and countless activists operating sub rosa.
Tunisia`s germinal political landscape today is the polar opposite of what once was. Following the 2010–2011 uprisings, parties were budding everywhere. The number of parties has now reached 118. During the campaign season for the October 23rd elections for the Constituent Assembly, it was near impossible to keep track of them all — Marxists, progressives, Islamists, conservatives, and nationalists of all stripes. Just like most countries that undergo a transformative democratizing revolution (otherwise known as revolutionary fever), the number of parties slowly started dwindling off. Now, it is a matter of survival of the fittest.
The fittest at the present moment is, by all means and measurements, the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance Party). Ennahda enjoys a level of organization that is unmatched in Tunisia’s political terrain. What holds the party together, for one, is that its main structural pillars were preserved during Ben Ali`s regime, in hiding and abroad in exile. Additionally, Ennahda members are highly disciplined, consistently voting in line with the party`s political platform. The platform has become a set of beliefs that is shared between all members of the party, serving as a partial representation of their social and religious worldview. Their aqidah (creed) and its connection to their faith dramatically increase their level of political coherence, especially between each other and within the party`s political and executive bureaus.The party`s electoral campaign was also highly commendable, venturing into the heart of Tunisia and campaigning door-to-door in underdeveloped inland regions where only a few dared to enter.
Ennahda, which won a plurality of votes in the October 2011 elections, eventually formed a coalition with two leading secularist parties that garnered the second and fourth highest number of votes. After the elections, the center-left CPR and a social democratic party named Ettakatol (Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties) successfully entered into “Troïka” negotiations with Ennahda to "proportionally" divide up ministerial and other high-level governmental posts. The President of the Republic position went to Moncef Marzouki, a human rights activist and one of CPR’s co-founders; the Prime Minister role was given to Ennahda`s Secretary General Hamadi Jebali; and the President of the Constituent Assembly post went to Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Ettakatol’s Secretary General.
Compared to other parties, CPR and Ettakatol appear to be faring well. Yet, this could not be farther from the truth. Since the coalition`s "Troïka" negotiations, the two parties have been experiencing major cracks in their operational management and maintenance. In CPR`s case, a fission has developed along ideological lines. Some members of each respective party do not agree on one detail or another pertaining to the Troïka negotiations, and slowly, two opposing sides have effectively crystallized in each party. Conversation has been steadily degenerating, too, between each of the sides. CPR, for instance, has always prided itself on not holding an ideological stance, bringing Tunisians of all backgrounds and ideologies together to support human rights and a republican form of governance. However, what was once a point of pride is now a source of discord amongst CPR`s ranks. Two camps have emerged: one in support of Secretary General Abderraouf Ayadi and his plans to strengthen the party`s influence in government and another camp that stands firmly with the CPR political bureau’s decisions made during the negotiations. Similar eruptions have led to remarkable disaccord in Ettakatol as well — leading to several resignations.
An imagery of political subservience to Ennahda is plaguing, and thus paralyzing, the two parties. While the Troïka agreement is a source of discomfort for many within Ettakatol and CPR, the time has come for both parties to quit the grousing and direly reassess their electoral standing. At this rate, their political horizons do not look good. This, by sheer nature of consequence, spells out an unfortunate future for the country`s democratic aspirations. A pluralistic political landscape is not easily achieved, nor will it ever be a given boon to be assumed, particularly in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary context.
If CPR and Ettakatol members do not mobilize to fix their respective parties quickly enough, then Ennahda might be left as the only able party standing. Later, with the lack of viable competition, Islamists could be wrongly afforded the ability to usurp power and adopt hegemonic attitudes, imposing political and socioeconomic programs on all Tunisians. Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The two secularist parties in the Troïka, along with smaller opposition parties, are currently the only check on Ennahda. The reorganization of Ettakatol and CPR will not only help their voter base gravitate towards actuating respective programs, but will serve as a guarantee for a pluralistic Tunisian society.