On Syria and Its Neighbors: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad Featured in CNN Panel Column

[A Syrian rebel in the Khaldiyeh neighborhood in Homs province, Syria, walks past ammunition embedded in the road, May 15, 2012. Image by Fadi Zaidan/AP Photo] [A Syrian rebel in the Khaldiyeh neighborhood in Homs province, Syria, walks past ammunition embedded in the road, May 15, 2012. Image by Fadi Zaidan/AP Photo]

On Syria and Its Neighbors: Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad Featured in CNN Panel Column

By : Jadaliyya Reports

[The below panel column by Nicole Dow was published on CNN.com on Wednesday 16 May 2012 under the title "Syrian outcome could alter its neighbors` futures." It features four perspectives on the uprising in Syria and its regional implication, one of which is provided by Jadaliyya Co-Editor Bassam Haddad.]

Syrian outcome could alter its neighbors`s futures

As events continue to unfold in Syria, the future of this Arab nation remains unknown.

There are many questions. Will the regime of President Bashar al-Assad eventually fall? If so, what kind of leadership would replace al-Assad? If not, would al-Assad`s style of governance change?

The answers will have a major impact on Syria`s neighbors and the Middle East.

It`s a complicated web of affairs, laced with deep historical, political and religious ties. There are several factors to consider: Syria`s relationships with Iran and Hezbollah; its presence in neighboring Lebanon, a country struggling to maintain a delicate balance among its religious and ethnic sects; and the roles of Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

We asked four people to share their thoughts on the connection between Syria and the current state of affairs in the region, posing the question: "What kind of impact do the events in Syria have on the rest of the Middle East?"

Leverett: War could draw in other countries

Hillary Mann Leverett teaches foreign policy at American University in Washington. A former White House official who worked on Middle East issues, she held various roles with the State Department, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. She is also co-author of the blog RaceForIran.com.

The civil war in Syria is likely to prove a watershed for the Middle East`s balance of power. It has the potential to become a full-blown regional war that could spill over into other countries and bring those countries into conflict, through proxies and perhaps even directly.

On top of that, the temptation to arm and fund Syrian rebels could spark a great power confrontation over Syria. Russia and China have made it clear that that they oppose foreign military intervention in Syria, especially by the United States. And in Russia`s case, it has made it clear that it will protect Syria, its beachhead in the Mediterranean. Russia has a longtime relationship with the country, and it has drawn a red line against U.S. intervention. Russia has sent naval assets, weapons and radar to Syria, and it could even send Russian personnel to protect it. Russia and China`s approach to the Syrian conflict is very different from the posture they took toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Western military intervention in Libya.

If you watch the Western or Gulf states` media, you would have the impression that everyone in Syria opposes and is fighting the government. This is not true. In Syria, a significant portion of the population is disaffected, but the majority still supports the regime. A series of public polls, for example, show that the al-Assad government still retains a majority of the support of the population. The reason? The basic majority, about 55% of the population, is terrified at the prospect of the other 45% forming a Sunni Islamist tyranny over the country. The 55% have held together -- as they have for decades -- to essentially hold Syria together as an independent, secular political order.

There are now several countries, principally Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, France and the U.S., that have aligned themselves with the angry minority. The strategic problem for these countries is that even if rebels are militarily successful and force al-Assad from power, the new government would be one that roughly 55% of the population does not want and/or fears. This means that without a negotiated way forward, we know that the outcome of arming or supporting the rebels means -- at a minimum -- only sustained violence and instability in Syria and for the region.

Tabler: `Cold war` between Shiites, Sunnis

Andrew J. Tabler is the Next Generation fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is also the author of "In the Lion`s Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington`s Battle with Syria."

The events in Syria impact the general struggle between Iran and the Sunni-Arab alliance in the region. The minority Shiite Alawite-dominated regime in Syria is backed by Iran, and the majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims.

There is sort of a cold war taking place between the two sides. I think you can see that playing out in terms of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey clearly on the side of the opposition in Syria, while the Iranians are strongly backing the regime. What`s at stake is larger than what`s within Syria`s borders.

Syria is a keystone of the Iranian alliance. It allows Iran to protect its power on the shores of the Mediterranean and its border with Israel, particularly its support of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

And the more this violence continues, especially with the regime using brutal force, the more it enrages people in the Sunni Arab countries. Although other governments have been holding back in their support of the opposition until recently, there are many individuals in the region who will help sponsor the opposition within Syria.

A lot of this is about the future of the Arab world and what the basis of these governments will be. For so long, it has been based on narrow regimes and, in the case of Syria, a narrow minority regime. Whatever comes next is likely to be a majoritarian system that has a larger base.

Haddad: Interference would change the dynamics

Bassam Haddad is the director of Middle East studies at George Mason University. He is also the homepage editor of Jadaliyya, an independent online Arab affairs magazine produced by the Arab Studies Institute. Haddad wrote "Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience."

The Syrian situation is complex like any other uprising, but the situation has added complexity because it is at the juncture of several conflicts in the region. Those struggles involve local, regional, and international power plays that make the situation a lot more charged.

For instance, we have Syria at the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria is part of an axis, so to speak, with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, confronting imperialism in various forms from inside and outside the region, particularly in relation to U.S. domination and Israel`s occupations and belligerence.

There is also resistance to the conservative Arab camp that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other conservative countries that are usually allies with the United States.

Also, Syria is, in many ways, the guarantor of stability in Lebanon. Syria`s presence in Lebanon has guaranteed some stability despite many violations of Lebanon`s sovereignty by Syria.

For all these reasons, Syria`s position in the region is pivotal. This is not simply another uprising against a dictator. It is also being transformed by other players into an effort to redraw the political map of the region and curtail further protests elsewhere.

A lot of the anti-regime actors and analysts are placed in an odd position. They do not support the regime or the turn that the uprising has taken since fall of last year. So perhaps the task is to build an independent opposition away from the dictates of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the United States.

Military intervention in Syria will bring in Iran and Hezbollah, and that will change the dynamic of the conflict. Most people in the region are opposed to the Syrian regime`s domestic behavior during the past decades, but they are not opposed to its regional role. The problem is the Syrian regime`s internal repression, not its external policies.

If there is no interference from the outside, the uprisings will be seen as legitimate. If it becomes regional and you bring in the U.S. and Israel in a fight against the Syrian regime, it changes the strategic dynamics of the conflict -- and not just the players involved.

Dunne: Democracy takes time

Michele Dunne is the director of the Atlantic Council`s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East in Washington. Previously, she was a Middle East affairs specialist at the State Department and the White House. She also served as a diplomat in Cairo and Jerusalem.

When I travel to the Middle East, it is striking how in the eastern part of the Arab world, sectarian issues are right on the surface of public discourse and shape the way people look at the uprisings.

For example, the same person might support the uprising in Syria but not the one in Bahrain, or vice versa, depending on whether that person is Sunni or Shiite Muslim.

There are many reasons for this, including the rise of Iran and the unleashing of sectarian sentiments in Iraq after Saddam Hussein was deposed. Sectarian feeling is less pronounced in the western part of the Arab world, which is largely populated by Sunnis.

Last summer, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states abandoned al-Assad and withdrew their ambassadors from Syria. Perhaps they did this partly because they saw how strong the popular uprising in Syria was and assessed that al-Assad might not be able to outlast it. Perhaps they also saw a chance of getting a Sunni majority government into power in Syria, which would make the Gulf states more comfortable. Probably, their desire to change the regional sectarian and political power balance has largely dictated their policies toward Syria.

Certainly, Syria has been a key cog in the machine of Iran`s influence in the Levant. Syria has provided the avenue through which Iran could project political influence into Lebanon and Palestine through Hezbollah and Hamas.

The Hamas link with Syria has already been broken. Hamas has turned against al-Assad, partly out of support for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and partly because Damascus is no longer a safe haven for them. Hamas is now working on closer relations with Egypt, where the Brotherhood controls close to half of the parliament, is running a candidate for president, and is likely to have a strong presence in the new Cabinet.

We are not going to see in any of the Arab countries a neat transition to a democracy in a year or two. Countries do not make that shift -- from authoritarianism to democracy -- so rapidly. Achieving a well-functioning democracy could happen in perhaps 10 to 15 years. There will be setbacks, bloodshed, and disappointments along the way. But we have to stay with this for a while, develop sustainable strategies to help these countries, and not abandon them a year or two into their transitions.

The opportunity to establish functioning democracies in the Arab world is a tremendous and historic one for the Middle East, and the risks if these transitions fail -- with all that could bring in terms of instability, safe havens for terrorists, etc. -- are also enormous.

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Past is Present: Settler Colonialism Matters!

On 5-6 March 2011, the Palestine Society at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London will hold its seventh annual conference, "Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine." This year`s conference aims to understand Zionism as a settler colonial project which has, for more than a century, subjected Palestine and Palestinians to a structural and violent form of destruction, dispossession, land appropriation and erasure in the pursuit of a new Jewish Israeli society. By organizing this conference, we hope to reclaim and revive the settler colonial paradigm and to outline its potential to inform and guide political strategy and mobilization.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described as unique and exceptional with little resemblance to other historical or ongoing colonial conflicts. Yet, for Zionism, like other settler colonial projects such as the British colonization of Ireland or European settlement of North America, South Africa or Australia, the imperative is to control the land and its resources -- and to displace the original inhabitants. Indeed, as conference keynote speaker Patrick Wolfe, one of the foremost scholars on settler colonialism and professor at La Trobe University in Victoria, Australia, argues, "the logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct--invasion is a structure not an event."[i]

Therefore, the classification of the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project, and the Israeli state as its manifestation, is not merely intended as a statement on the historical origins of Israel, nor as a rhetorical or polemical device. Rather, the aim is to highlight Zionism`s structural continuities and the ideology which informs Israeli policies and practices in Palestine and toward Palestinians everywhere. Thus, the Nakba -- whether viewed as a spontaneous, violent episode in war, or the implementation of a preconceived master plan -- should be understood as both the precondition for the creation of Israel and the logical outcome of Zionist settlement in Palestine.

Moreover, it is this same logic that sustains the continuation of the Nakba today. As remarked by Benny Morris, “had he [David Ben Gurion] carried out full expulsion--rather than partial--he would have stabilised the State of Israel for generations.”[ii] Yet, plagued by an “instability”--defined by the very existence of the Palestinian nation--Israel continues its daily state practices in its quest to fulfill Zionism’s logic to maximize the amount of land under its control with the minimum number of Palestinians on it. These practices take a painful array of manifestations: aerial and maritime bombardment, massacre and invasion, house demolitions, land theft, identity card confiscation, racist laws and loyalty tests, the wall, the siege on Gaza, cultural appropriation, and the dependence on willing (or unwilling) native collaboration and security arrangements, all with the continued support and backing of imperial power. 

Despite these enduring practices however, the settler colonial paradigm has largely fallen into disuse. As a paradigm, it once served as a primary ideological and political framework for all Palestinian political factions and trends, and informed the intellectual work of committed academics and revolutionary scholars, both Palestinians and Jews.

The conference thus asks where and why the settler colonial paradigm was lost, both in scholarship on Palestine and in politics; how do current analyses and theoretical trends that have arisen in its place address present and historical realities? While acknowledging the creativity of these new interpretations, we must nonetheless ask: when exactly did Palestinian natives find themselves in a "post-colonial" condition? When did the ongoing struggle over land become a "post-conflict" situation? When did Israel become a "post-Zionist" society? And when did the fortification of Palestinian ghettos and reservations become "state-building"?

In outlining settler colonialism as a central paradigm from which to understand Palestine, this conference re-invigorates it as a tool by which to analyze the present situation. In doing so, it contests solutions which accommodate Zionism, and more significantly, builds settler colonialism as a political analysis that can embolden and inform a strategy of active, mutual, and principled Palestinian alignment with the Arab struggle for self-determination, and indigenous struggles in the US, Latin America, Oceania, and elsewhere.

Such an alignment would expand the tools available to Palestinians and their solidarity movement, and reconnect the struggle to its own history of anti-colonial internationalism. At its core, this internationalism asserts that the Palestinian struggle against Zionist settler colonialism can only be won when it is embedded within, and empowered by, the broader Arab movement for emancipation and the indigenous, anti-racist and anti-colonial movement--from Arizona to Auckland.

SOAS Palestine Society invites everyone to join us at what promises to be a significant intervention in Palestine activism and scholarship.

For over 30 years, SOAS Palestine Society has heightened awareness and understanding of the Palestinian people, their rights, culture, and struggle for self-determination, amongst students, faculty, staff, and the broader public. SOAS Palestine society aims to continuously push the frontiers of discourse in an effort to make provocative arguments and to stimulate debate and organizing for justice in Palestine through relevant conferences, and events ranging from the intellectual and political impact of Edward Said`s life and work (2004), international law and the Palestine question (2005), the economy of Palestine and its occupation (2006), the one state (2007), 60 Years of Nakba, 60 Years of Resistance (2009), and most recently, the Left in Palestine (2010).

For more information on the SOAS Palestine Society 7th annual conference, Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine: www.soaspalsoc.org

SOAS Palestine Society Organizing Collective is a group of committed students that has undertaken to organize annual academic conferences on Palestine since 2003.

 


[i] Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Cassell, London, p. 163

[ii] Interview with Benny Morris, Survival of the Fittest, Haaretz, 9. January 2004, http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/art.php?aid=5412