Andrew Arsan, Lebanon: A Country in Fragments (New Texts Out Now)

Andrew Arsan, Lebanon: A Country in Fragments (New Texts Out Now)

Andrew Arsan, Lebanon: A Country in Fragments (New Texts Out Now)

By : Andrew Arsan

Andrew Arsan, Lebanon: A Country in Fragments (London: Hurst & Company, 2018)

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Andrew Arsan (AA): I returned to Lebanon in 2005, after an absence of almost fifteen years. I remember from this visit a sense of growing discord and a fear of the political class’s capacity to capture moments and movements of freedom, turning them to their own ends, but also a feeling of optimism, of relief, of opening as friends and relatives across the political spectrum looked to the future with renewed expectations. It is clear now, even at this relatively short remove, that this was not a moment of new beginnings, but one of closure, of exclusion and rupture, which brought low the political order that had prevailed since the end of the civil war in 1990, but which gave rise only to a new polarized, paralyzed dispensation, in which the contest for power and prominence between the two blocs of March 14 and March 8, and their irresolvable differences on key issues, had a deadening effect on political life.

This sense of futures foreclosed, drift and stasis only gained in amplitude over subsequent years, with all the assassinations and resignations, ultimatums, vacuums, term extensions, threats and counter-threats, tussles, insults, bargains, and volte-faces that are the unedifying stuff of Lebanese political life, and with the wearying, anxiety-making stresses of the everyday—the power cuts and traffic jams, the low wages and high rents and shop windows full of unaffordable stuff, the stench of trash and the sense of graft, of unfairness and inequality, of paths to social mobility blocked off by nepotism. Increasingly, Lebanon came to feel like a country standing still, caught in a continuous present, haunted by violence and harried by external pressures.

The story of these years, then, is a sad one, but it was one that I felt viscerally needed telling, so that the travails of those who have lived through these times, and the strategies they have devised to evade their constraints, are accounted for. For all the onrush of wonderful scholarship on Lebanon in recent years, general works on the country still tend to focus on the flickering loyalties and fluid alignments of Lebanon’s political class, the geopolitical stakes of its porous sovereignty, and the workings of confessionalism—taking the latter, in particular, as the master key that will unlock understanding of Lebanon.

Such an approach, however, is insufficient. It leaves too much out to make sense of contemporary life in Lebanon, and considers it an exceptional place, to be treated in isolation. Far from an island of exceptionality, though, Lebanon is a place that can tell us a great deal about the early twenty-first century world—a world of financial globalization and growing nativism, of neoliberal privatization, of frantic consumption and narcissism, depressed cultivation of the self, of disaffection and anxiety, of displacement and refuge, precarity and inequality.

In short, I wrote this book because I am persuaded that what has happened in Lebanon since 2005, and the particular shape that life has taken there, matters—not just to those who are interested in Lebanon or the Middle East, but to all those who care about the world in which we live today and worry about what is to be done.

I lay the emphasis on the politics of the everyday, showing the ways in which wearying quotidian realities, preoccupations, desires and needs shape the social, political, and cultural worlds of Lebanon’s inhabitants

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

AA: Lebanon: A Country in Fragments is an attempt to provide an overview of the contemporary Lebanese experience in its totality. It begins with a narrative of the political events of the years after 2005, intended to provide those with relatively little knowledge of Lebanon’s recent history with a guide.

The book then moves on to consider other aspects of contemporary life in Lebanon, from political leadership and partisanship, to a political economy that privileges private, particular interests over the common good, creating a glut of high-end real estate development while allowing for systemic infrastructural failure, and from the routines and expectations of leisure and pleasure to the precarious, demanding lives of Lebanon’s migrant workers and refugees. The book closes with an account of the trash crisis that began in the summer of 2015 and the political mobilization that it prompted, with its brave, beautiful, thwarted vision of a new commonweal.

Throughout, I lay the emphasis on the politics of the everyday, showing the ways in which wearying quotidian realities, preoccupations, desires and needs shape the social, political, and cultural worlds of Lebanon’s inhabitants, and how these daily stresses and strains are shaped in turn by broader, structural features of the country’s political economy. Though the latter are formidable forces to reckon with, I argue that human agency is always a part of the story—that ordinary people find ways of navigating the constraints in their way, strategies that allow them as best they can to endure and perhaps even to find some fleeting pleasure, but also that even seemingly impersonal forces are the product of willful actors, of ministers and central bankers, property developers, and entrepreneurs whose moves have created a particular structure of life.

This book is also an attempt to bring together and offer tribute to a rich outpouring of recent work by cultural anthropologists, critical geographers, architects, urban planners, sociologists, political scientists, and scholars of law, gender, and political economy. This is a book that would quite literally have been impossible to conceive and write without the insights I have gleaned from the writings of scholars like Mona Fawaz, Lara Deeb, Mona Harb, Abir Saksouk-Sasso, Nadine Bekdache, Maya Mikdashi, Laleh Khalili, Sylvain Perdigon, Liz Saleh, Ziad Abu-Rish and a host of others who have informed my understanding of contemporary Lebanon. It is important to recognize here their transformative achievements.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

AA: At one level, this book marks a departure—both chronological and methodological—from my earlier work, which focused on the social, cultural, and intellectual histories of the early twentieth-century Eastern Mediterranean and its diasporas. My first book, Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa, reconstructed the moving lives of Eastern Mediterranean migrants, examining the ways in which displacement compelled them to devise new ways of living, of dwelling between places and making do with what came to hand. In a series of articles, I began to explore the intellectual history of the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean from the 1880s to the 1950s, or thereabouts. The themes of these pieces ranged from the uses of the ancient past and the recasting of Islamic historiography to the discursive norms that underpinned associational life and political praxis, and the Middle Eastern genealogy of human rights talk – all topics that seem a world away from twenty-first-century Lebanon.

At another level, though, I think there are deeper connections running through my work over the last decade: a desire to unpick the strategies that ordinary people rely on to find a course through life and the vernacular political languages to which they cling, to make sense of the interpenetration of discourse and practice, of language and life, and to break Lebanon out of its cell of exceptionalism, to bring the insights of other bodies of scholarship to bear on this place and, at the same time, to use it as a place to think from, an analytical prism through which to look on the late modern world.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

AA: Like all authors, I hope this book will reach as wide a readership as possible. With that said I really have two, slightly paradoxical, ambitions for it: the first is that it will be read by people who may not know a great deal about contemporary Lebanon, but who want to learn more, moving beyond the shallow tropes of confessionalism, cosmopolitanism, and conflict; the second is that it will be read in Lebanon, and by the Lebanese, as part of a broader conversation on the country’s present and future and the prospects for moving beyond the current dispensation. In short, I did not write this purely for an academic. I hope, of course, that students and scholars will read it, profit from what it has to say, and engage critically with its arguments. However, I firmly believe that one does not have to be an academic to find something in this book, addressing as it does so many of the pressing issues that concern us all, in Lebanon and the world.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AA: I am currently working on three interrelated projects. The first is a history of the lands that became Lebanon, from the Ottoman conquest of Bilad al-Sham in 1516 to the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. The second is a new history of Beirut. In a sense, these will be the third and fourth installments in a quartet of books about Lebanon, after works on diaspora and contemporary life. The third of my current projects is a more ambitious and a longer-term undertaking: a new history of Arab political thought from the 1860s to the 1920s.

 

Excerpt from the Book:

[pp. 2-4]

What does it mean, and how does it feel, to attempt to live an ordinary life in extraordinary times? What are the joys and expectations, the fears and anxieties, the aspirations, hopes, disappointments, and sorrows that have marked the lives of the men and women who have lived through these unusual times? And how have they striven to maintain a hold over their own lives, in an effort to keep the years from drifting away on the currents of contingency? What strategies for everyday living and political action have they devised to fight the pull of events, to stay afloat and keep their heads above water? What are the discourses and rhetorical devices – from jokes to slogans, and sectarian polemics to political programmes – to which they have resorted to make sense of the unfamiliar, uncanny landscape of the present? It has often seemed over the last thirteen years as though the ordinary order of things had been suspended, giving way to the exceptional and the makeshift, the unexpected, the contingent and the provisional. Uncertainty and precarity have come to leave their indelible imprint on the lives of many, often taking as profound an emotional and psychic toll as they exact an economic cost. If Lebanon’s politicians have sometimes appeared to be indulging in what – to borrow a term from the political scientist Lisa Wedeen – could be called the politics of ‘as if’, then its inhabitants have simply been engaged in the politics of getting by. Every act, every choice is political in contemporary Lebanon. Whether it signals a tacit acceptance of prevailing social norms, an attempt to deflect the weight of structural forces, or an outright rejection of the status quo, it is also always a reminder of the sheer effort required just to muddle through and get on with the day-to-day in times of crisis. This book argues that, if we are to understand Lebanon in the twenty-first century, we cannot ignore the fraught politics of the everyday in times like these, times out of joint when all seems awry.

But why should any of this matter? To most outside the small circle of academic specialists and foreign policy analysts who work on Lebanon, the country seems of limited significance. It is not India, China or the United States, Russia, South Africa or Brazil, countries whose importance seems self-evident, a function as much of their immense territorial extent as of their demographic, economic and geopolitical heft. Lebanon, by contrast, is a small state. With a population roughly equivalent to that of New Zealand – at least before its ranks were swollen by the coming of Syrian refugees – it is just a little bigger than the Bahamas, and smaller even than other Middle Eastern states hardly reputed for their size, such as Kuwait and Qatar. But that is perhaps why Lebanon does matter. For it can seem at times a microcosm of the contemporary world, a petri dish in which we can observe the microbial strains of late modernity. This was certainly the response of my partner, Sophie, on her first visit to Lebanon in 2013. After a few days in the country, she turned to me as we were walking through the barren web of streets that is Beirut’s central business district, and said: ‘so this is what neoliberalism looks like’. The point, of course, is not that the effects of neoliberal logic might not be apparent in Britain or the United States – far from it – but that the workings of the contemporary world can perhaps best be glimpsed in miniature, and from elsewhere. As Jean and John Comaroff have noted, it might make sense to begin from the post-colonies of the Middle East, Africa or Asia if we are to understand our own times, for ‘many of the great historical tsunamis of the twenty-first century appear to be breaking first on their shores’.

From the glinting lures of populism, with its dual illusion of government for the people, by a man of the people, to populism’s obverse, technocracy and its fantasies of an antiseptic world of expertise, cleansed of inconvenient political realities; from the strains put on the social body by mass displacement, to policies that foster inequality and precarity in the name of perpetual growth, and the exhausting sense of living in a time of permanent crisis – so much of what seems to characterise our contemporary condition can be found in Lebanon. By concentrating, if even for a while, on this small country, we can better understand the workings of those techniques of government, those dispositions and ideologies, those bundles of words and practices and sentiments that frame the way we live now. And perhaps nothing defines our contemporary predicament more than the sense of living in a permanent present. Whether we are held in the sway of contingency, uncertain of what this day or the next might bring, or caught up in a tangle of constant consumption and compulsive, episodic living, forever checking what might have happened in the machine worlds we are tethered to, we seem to live an existence characterised by the ‘dissolution of past and future alike’. On the one hand, the ‘horizon’ of the future ‘is apparently closed’: there is no way for people to know where they are heading, no pensions or political programmes to cling on to. The future is simply ‘unthinkable … unimaginable’. On the other, ‘the past has apparently receded’. Once the live matter from which the present was shaped, the past is now reduced to bitter memories or ‘dusty images’, grounds only for resentment and nostalgia. This seems particularly clear in the case of Lebanon, where so many live day-by-day, where politics is devoid of ideology – devoid, in other words, of any consideration of the future – and where the past is commemorated or destroyed, but never remembered. But we can also glimpse, in looking at Lebanon, the outlines of alternative strategies for living – efforts to devise different ways of being in the world, less complicit in the compromises, the illusions and disillusions of late modernity, and founded in the making of community. Looking at Lebanon, in other words, can help us to understand the world in which we live now.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.