Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, eds., The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History (New Texts Out Now)

Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, eds., The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History (New Texts Out Now)

Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, eds., The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History (New Texts Out Now)

By : Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg

 

Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, eds., The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this volume?

Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg (BB and AG): The Holocaust for Jews and the Nakba for Palestinians are what the historian Alon Confino termed “foundational pasts,” or what the political psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called “chosen traumas.” This coedited volume is part of an ongoing, collaborative project that began nearly seven years ago in an attempt to find a way to deal with the two traumas together, despite the obvious differences between them. We, the editors, come from different disciplinary backgrounds (political theory and cultural history), which is simultaneously enriching and challenging. But this is in a way a group project in which leading Arab, Jewish, and international scholars came together to explore the possibility of creating a shared language for discussing these traumas together. On the one hand, this is essential for historical, moral, and political reasons. On the other hand, it is nearly impossible.

It is essential because we cannot avoid history and its implications when thinking about Israel/Palestine and a potential future resolution. In many situations, when either the Holocaust or the Nakba is mentioned in a discussion, the other will be immediately mentioned as well. Moreover, the Holocaust that evolved in Europe during the twelve years of Nazi regime (1933-1945) and the Nakba that happened in 1948 and is continuing ever since, are extremely interrelated historically. They happened in one historical continuum and they are connected in so many ways. So, in the context of Israel/Palestine, they must be discussed together.

Politically speaking, we think that the idea of "separation/partition"—the dominant paradigm for discussing Israel/Palestine since the Peel Commission in 1937—failed. Moreover, separation is an immoral and impossible idea; binational politics and discourse should be developed instead (by binational, we do not necessarily mean a binational state). In encountering history, binationalism means to our mind, first and foremost two major things: 1) that the Nakba is a fundamental part of Israeli and Zionist history for which Israelis have to take responsibility, while the Holocaust is—in a very different way—also a part of Palestinian history because they could not avoid its local consequences and its global significance. 2) The Israelis do not own and cannot dominate the discourse of history, memory, and trauma. This discursive framework has to be sensitive and has to make room for both traumas, therefore rejecting hierarchies of suffering.

We believe that this way of thinking supports and should even lead to a binational political solution that defies "separation." We try to elaborate on this more in our introduction.

Yet, relating to these two traumas together in an appropriate way is a difficult topic for various reasons, which we acknowledge and respect. It touches very sensitive nerves on both sides. The Holocaust is an extreme genocide that should not be banalized by irresponsible historical comparisons. At the same time, there is significant asymmetry in the responsibility of each party to the catastrophe of the other, as the Palestinians bear no responsibility for the Jewish genocide but Israel is totally responsible for the ongoing Palestinian Nakba. Nonetheless, we wanted to suggest that the phrase "the Holocaust and the Nakba" has, and ought to have, a valid historical, political, and moral meaning. In this volume, we hope we began creating a new syntax and grammar to give meaning to this phrase.

Some of the chapters focus on historical episodes that connect the two events and make us think differently about history and memory.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

BB and AG: As an edited volume, the book naturally addresses many topics that are discussed from various disciplinary perspectives. In our introduction, we suggest three registers of reasoning for discussing the two events together: cultural, historical, and ethical-political. One chapter gives a very broad historical contextualization of mass violence in the modern era, connecting the Holocaust and the Nakba as well as other events of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass violence. Some of the chapters focus on historical episodes that connect the two events and make us think differently about history and memory. Other chapters show how cultural and artistic symbols emigrated from the discourse over one of the events to the other. A special section in the book is devoted to the intersection of these two events in the recent novel, The Children of the Ghetto: My Name is Adam, by the acclaimed Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury, who wrote a preface to this volume.

We should also state the obvious. One can sense that as an edited book it does not speak in one voice. There are differences and disagreements in tone and in substance between the different writers, even if there is a common shared ground. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

AG: Some of my scholarly work is apparently not related to this book. I am a Holocaust historian working on Jewish life and experiences during the Holocaust. However, other parts of my work could be considered as the ground from which this work stemmed. I have written quite a lot on collective traumas and reflected critically about the uses and abuses of Holocaust memory in Israel and the West in the global age. I also worked on the tensions that exist within Holocaust and genocide historiography between the Holocaust meta-narrative and the post-colonial meta-narrative. These issues are at the heart of this book.  

BB: For several years, my work has focused exclusively on theoretical and abstract debates around deliberative democracy, multiculturalism, reconciliation, and citizenship and nationalism studies. In recent years, in light of systematic and aggressive Israeli colonial policies, I have turned to combining my interest in political theory with pressing issues that inform and shape the realities in Israel/Palestine. My main motivation has mainly revolved around interrogating paradigmatic notions like partition and exploring alternatives to partition and venues for decolonization.

Together we published in 2015 an edited volume in Hebrew (with the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute) on the same topic. The book in Hebrew is a different book in terms of content and contributors. Upon its publication, the book generated heated debate and controversy in Israel. Though many found it useful and eye-opening, some right wing groups protested harshly against it, and this debate even reached the media. Since then, we continue publishing on this issue and we hope to continue developing this historical and conceptual endeavor. This volume in English is part of a preexisting and continuing effort. There is still much to do in order to persuade scholars that it is a valid and essential historical and political scholarly framework.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AG: Part of my current work is also related to this volume. I am very much interested in the ways by which contemporary individuals related to these two events. Once I became aware of this perspective on history, I could see that many sources actually talk about it in so many ways. Hence, I recently wrote an article about a Holocaust survivor who fought in the 1948 Israeli-Arab War, and for him the two events were completely interrelated. This intellectual journey also led me to write about Elias Khoury's novel Bab al-Shams, which to my mind integrates the two events in a most interesting and intriguing way. I am now writing a piece on The Children of the Ghetto which was mentioned above.

BB: My current research focuses on two major research projects. First, in light of the recent return to and revival of liberal principles and values like constitutionalism, the rule of law, common civic identity, and neutrality of the state institutions as guardians against the tribalism, fragmentation, and other risks of identity politics, I have started a research project that explores various attempts to reinvigorate liberal democratic thinking. Secondly, together with Leila Farsakh (University of Massachusetts, Boston), we have been leading a research project that aspires to revisit contemporary Arab engagements with the Jewish Question, namely the question of Jewish political rights under the light of European anti-Semitism and Zionism. It also explores Jewish engagements with the Arab Question, namely how Zionism and non-Zionist Jewish voices dealt with Palestinian presence and political rights in historic Palestine. These key political questions have been historically debated, but not juxtaposed, despite the fact that they have become inextricably intertwined.

J: What is the contribution of this book to memory and historical studies beyond Israel/Palestine?

BB and AG: While the volume proposes a new and original frame for a joint and productive conversation about the Holocaust and Nakba, our introductory chapter as well as several other chapters in the book offer normative and methodological insights concerning memory, trauma, and history in general. In many ways, this volume is an attempt to implement Michael Rothberg's concept of "multidirectional memory," perhaps in the place where it is most difficult and painful though at the same time essential. We think, and elaborate on this in the introduction, that the intersection of the Holocaust and the Nakba is actually an intersection of two global historical meta-narratives: the Holocaust narrative and the postcolonial narrative that clash and also intersect on several fronts. Thus, political theorists, historians, social psychologists, experts of conflict resolution and in memory studies will find profound debates about amnesia, strategies of narration, confronting and coming to terms with injustices etc. In this sense, the volume’s relevance exceeds the confined boundaries of Israel/Palestine and the Holocaust and Nakba.

 

Excerpt from the Book:

Elias Khoury’s Gate of the Sun (Bab al-Shams) narrates the Palestinian catastrophe.

During one of his monologues, Khaleel, the novel’s narrator and protagonist, directs a question at Younes, a hero of the Palestinian struggle, who lies unconsciously on his death bed in a hospital in one of the refugee camps in Beirut:

But tell me, what did the [Palestinian] national movement posted in the cities do apart from demonstrate against Jewish immigration?

I’m not saying you weren’t right. But in those days, when the Nazi beast was exterminating the Jews of Europe, what did you know about the world?

. . . Don’t worry, I believe, like you, that this land must belong to its people, and there is no moral, political, humanitarian, or religious justification that would permit the expulsion of an entire people from its country and the transformation of what remained of them into second-class citizens. . . . But tell me, in the faces of the people being driven to slaughter, don’t you see something resembling your own?

Don’t tell me you didn’t know, and above all, don’t say that it wasn’t our fault. You and I and every human being on the face of the planet should have known and not stood by in silence, should have prevented that beast from destroying its victims in that barbaric, unprecedented manner . . . because their death meant the death of humanity within us.

This critical passage may serve as a key to the issue at hand. It marks the problematic aspects of simultaneously addressing the Holocaust and the Nakba and the anxiety that this arouses. This is primarily an anxiety about foregoing absolute justice, which is shared by both Jews and Palestinians. The Nakba underlines Palestinian political justice, while the Holocaust currently underpins many Jews’ ultimate claim to justice. Yet the willingness to weave the catastrophe of the other side into each party’s national narrative, and to establish a new shared historical grammar and syntax, does not imply a dismantling of the core justification of the national narrative. Or, in the words of the narrator in Bab al-Shams, who here refers to the Palestinian perspective: acknowledging the Holocaust does not undermine the justness of the Palestinians regarding the wrong done to them or to question “that this land must belong to its people.” Taking account of the origin of the Jews who came to Palestine does not, from the narrator’s viewpoint, detract from the claim to justice on the part of the Palestinians. Neither does it imply that things would necessarily have turned out differently had the Palestinians taken into account why Jews came to Palestine. In other words, this empathy toward the Jewish victims of the Holocaust does not amount to a complete identification with them and their point of view. It does retain one’s otherness in relation to the “other.” It does not erase difference.

Nonetheless, from this very position the narrator, and seemingly Khoury himself, demand that the Jewish refugees’ plight be recognized: … “Their death meant the death of humanity within us.”

Following Hannan Hever, wefurther deliberate on Khoury’s narrator’s notion of otherness and empathy in regard to the Nakba and the Holocaust by means of the concept of “empathic unsettlement,” coined by Dominick LaCapra in his protracted discussion of trauma and the Holocaust. This concept manages to closely and convincingly link memory, ethics, history, and trauma in a way that we believe suits the notion of empathy we share with Khoury.

Before further elaboration on the usefulness of empathic unsettlement, we should note that in utilizing LaCapraian psychoanalytical concepts we are not seeking to reduce the narrative of conflict to the realm of psychology or issues of empathy….we try to extract from this conceptual world a theoretical structure that facilitates understanding and analysis of political reality.

LaCapra contrasts empathy and empathic unsettlement with complete identification:

“Empathy is mistakenly conflated with identification or fusion with the other. . . . In contradistinction to this entire frame of reference, empathy should rather be understood in terms of an affective relation, rapport, or bond with the other recognized and respected as other.” Identification follows the risky fantasy of universal likeness, which seeks homogeneity and eradicates difference. It operates on one of two levels—appropriation or subjugation— since, if it is to occur, the individual must either reduce the other to his own concepts or subjugate himself to the concepts of the other. Thus, identification is always connected to narcissistic impulses and indicates a type of illusion that is potentially aggressive and violent.

As we have argued, Khoury’s narrator is aware of the risky fantasy of universal likeness and sameness and rejects this form of identification. He refuses to relinquish his point of view for that of the enemy, even as the latter has experienced extreme trauma in the form of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, he finds some resemblance. (“In the faces of the people being driven to slaughter, don’t you see something resembling your own?”) But what is the significance of this recognition? How does it exert an influence? And what does it mean?

The narrator gives us no immediate or unequivocal answer to these questions. This response is suspended for the time being —it only destabilizes an overly stiff narrative. This, in fact, is how empathic unsettlement undermines meaning. For, by contrast to identification, which seeks to blur the distance between the self and the other, empathic unsettlement requires the subject to make, like Khoury’s narrator, two opposite movements simultaneously. On the one hand, it recognizes the fundamental, inherent otherness of the individual who experiences the trauma, defined as an excessive experience that transcends the existing array of social symbols and images.92 On the other hand, and despite the recognition of the radical and ineradicable otherness of those who experience trauma, empathic unsettlement calls for a sense of empathy toward them. Therefore, the ethics of trauma is an ethics of disruption that compels us to react empathetically to others while being fully aware of their otherness, and at the same time to recognize the component of trauma that disrupts and prevents any structure, narrative, or relationship from reaching wholeness and closure.

Disruption is the key word here, since it is located between the two poles that trauma is liable to generate: disruption neither completely dismantles the discourse (as a field of distinctions), nor does it fortify dichotomous opposition. It introduces some rather indigestible otherness to the discursive sphere, which emanates from an ethical commitment to those experiencing the trauma, but that cannot necessarily be formulated immediately. As such, empathic unsettlement disrupts and constantly undermines every “redeeming narrative” of suffering that offers a melancholic pleasure, and this is the source of its considerable political value. One might say that it compels us to take the otherness of the other seriously. It operates in the twilight zone between full identification, which appropriates the other or requires her to submit to the concepts of the “self,” and outright alienation, which generates a sphere from which communication is absent, in which only power dictates. The weakened identification experienced as part of empathic unsettlement is therefore sensed not only vis-à-vis the person experiencing the trauma as someone who is suffering, but first and foremost as an “other” in whose core experience there is something that goes beyond the symbolic and political contours that purport to represent him. And this turns him into a symbol and manifestation of intense ethical commitment toward radical otherness.

We have formulated the demand for empathic unsettlement by means of Khoury’s well-crafted story. Nevertheless, we would argue that the demand applies more to the Jewish side, which is, as we have noted, the stronger side and the one that perpetrated the Nakba. The story of “from Holocaust to rebirth” is such a closed, exclusive, and redemptive narrative that it necessarily leads to violence, and must therefore be disrupted by means of the imperative of empathic unsettlement. The demand that Khoury presents to the Palestinians should be presented with even greater urgency to the Jews as well. After decades of colonial denial, negation, erasure, and misrecognition, they should look in the faces of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants, whom they expelled or whose return they prevented, and in the faces of those who stayed in Palestine and the State of Israel and now live under varying degrees of discrimination and repression, and see in them the radical others of Zionism, a reflection of their own history, and seek a way to recognize the suffering they have inflicted on them. They ought to find a way to disrupt their narrative through paradoxical empathy for their own victims, the Palestinians (refugees and nonrefugees), and to tell the story not only of “from Holocaust to rebirth” but, like the title of a book by Yair Auron, The Holocaust, Rebirth, and the Nakba. This is the moral challenge that empathic unsettlement presents to the Jewish side.

 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.